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NATURAL DISASTERS AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:  
FROM CHAOS TO CLARITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The devastation was overwhelming.” . . . There were severely 
injured people everywhere, dead bodies wedged under fallen 
houses, people with deep cuts from the sheets of glass and metal 
that had churned through the rushing water like sharks’ teeth. 
Dive boats, under which the tsunami had passed as an unre-
markable two-foot swell on the open water, came back piled high 
with bodies that had been swept out to sea. It was chaos, and 
there was no authority, no rescue agency, [and] no civil struc-
ture to deal with a catastrophe of this scale.1
atural disasters, either resulting from or exacerbated by natural 
phenomena,2 such as earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, hurri-
canes, and famines, are of increasing worldwide concern.3 Affecting 
nearly two-hundred million people per year over the past two decades4 
N 
                                                                                                             
 1. Matthew Power, Special Report: The Tsunami Volunteers, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC: 
ADVENTURE, Apr. 2005, at 41, 44. 
 2. A United Nations (U.N.) study on disaster-preparedness classified disasters into 
two categories: man-made and natural. Man-made disasters, which are attributable to 
accidental, negligent, or deliberate human activity include: (1) civil disturbances, such as 
riots or demonstrations; (2) situations involving conventional, nuclear, biological, chemi-
cal, or guerilla welfare; (3) refugee situations; and (4) accidents involving transportation, 
collapse of buildings and dams, mine disasters, or technological failures, such as pollu-
tion, chemical leaks, or nuclear accidents. Natural disasters result from the effects of 
natural phenomena, which are characterized as: (1) meteorological, such as storms (cy-
clones, hailstorms, hurricanes, tornadoes, typhoons, and snowstorms), cold spells, heat 
waves, droughts, and famine; (2) topological, which include earthquakes, avalanches, 
landslides, and floods; and (3) biological, such as insect swarms and epidemics of com-
municable diseases. RUTH M. STRATTON, DISASTER RELIEF: THE POLITICS OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 22–23 (1989). The categorical distinction between 
man-made and natural disasters is not rigid, since allegedly “natural” disasters are not 
purely “natural,” but result from multiple causes, in part affected by “mankind’s relation-
ship with the environment.” PETER MACALISTER-SMITH, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE: DISASTER RELIEF ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 3 
(1985); Jacqueline P. Hand, Disaster Prevention Presentation, From SCJIL Symposium 
2003, 1 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 147 (2003). This Note focuses on purportedly natural 
disasters, either caused or exacerbated by natural phenomenon, which generate emer-
gency situations of grave human suffering and physical destruction. 
 3. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION [ISDR], Hyogo Framework for Action 
2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction (Jan. 18–22, 2005), at 1, available at 
http://www.unisdr.org/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/L-docs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-
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and causing billions of dollars in property damage worldwide,5 natural 
disasters “know no country, [no] region, no boundaries.”6 All over the 
world, people have endured their devastating consequences, such as loss 
of life and livelihoods, damaged infrastructure, and economic costs.7
Such devastation occurred on December 24, 2004 when the Indian 
Ocean tsunami killed nearly 240,000 people, displaced more than one-
million people, and devastated the infrastructure of twelve countries in 
South Asia and East Africa.8 This transnational natural disaster devas-
tated developing and vulnerable countries9 and demonstrated the need 
for humanitarian assistance10 from non-affected States11 (the interna-
 
english.pdf [hereinafter Hyogo Framework for Action] (noting the increasing interna-
tional concern for disasters due to worldwide vulnerability from environmental degrada-
tion, climate change, and geological hazards). 
 4. Id. at 1. 
 5. U.N. OFF. FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFF. [OCHA], IRIN Web 
Special: Disaster Reduction and the Human Cost of Disaster, June 2005, at 3, available 
at http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/DR/default.asp (noting that the U.N. Bureau for 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery asserted that from 1980 to 2000, approximately seventy-
five percent of the world’s population have suffered at least once from natural disasters. 
In 2003 alone, there were about 700 natural disasters, which resulted in nearly 75,000 
deaths and caused $65 billion in damage.). The U.N. established the OCHA to strengthen 
the response and effectiveness of the U.N.’s humanitarian operations in complex emer-
gencies and natural disasters. OCHA On-Line: About OCHA, 
http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Nav=_about_en&Site=_about (last visited Nov. 
24, 2005). 
 6. Tampere Gives Birth to a New Convention, ITU NEWS, July 1998, at 43, available 
at http://www.reliefweb.int/telecoms/tampere/n7eb2.pdf (quoting Pekka Tarjanne, Inter-
national Telecommunications Union Secretary-General, in Intergovernmental Conference 
on Emergency Telecommunications (ICET-98) Guide, June 1998, at 16–18). 
 7. G.A. Res. 59/279, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/279 (Jan. 28, 2005). 
 8. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Strengthening Emer-
gency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, Recovery and Prevention in the Aftermath 
of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster, ¶¶ 2–3, delivered to the Economic and Social 
Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/86–E/2005/77 (June 21, 2005) [here-
inafter Strengthening Emergency Relief]. 
 9. In the context of natural disasters, vulnerability refers to “[t]he conditions deter-
mined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes that increase 
the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards.” Hyogo Framework for Ac-
tion, supra note 3, at n.1; see also Strengthening Emergency Relief, supra note 8, ¶ 5 
(noting that the December 26th tsunami struck vulnerable countries, such as Indonesia, 
Somalia, and Sri Lanka, which were already undergoing long-standing complex crises). 
 10. For the purposes of this Note, the term “humanitarian assistance” is used inter-
changeably with “humanitarian relief” and “disaster relief.” These terms refer to the pro-
vision of relief for suffering natural disaster victims. Disaster relief consists of three cate-
gories: (1) assistance in kind, which refers to commodities and materials, such as food, 
clothing, medicine, and hospital equipment; (2) financial contributions, which refer to 
cash expenses; and (3) services of trained personnel, which refer to the operational, ad-
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tional community of States). Another notable disaster is Hurricane 
Katrina, which killed hundreds of people and ruined the lives of thou-
sands more throughout the southern United States.12 Although Hurricane 
Katrina’s physical impact was confined within U.S. borders, its aftermath 
attracted global concern because the United States needed disaster assis-
tance from the international community of States.13 These natural disas-
ters have demonstrated the international community of States’ vital role 
in facilitating humanitarian assistance to disaster-affected States for 
catastrophic transnational and national disasters.14
Generally, past natural disasters have demonstrated the international 
community of States’ willingness and generosity in providing relief to 
disaster-affected States. However, the provision of humanitarian assis-
tance to disaster-affected States can be problematic.15 Since there are no 
international legal obligations on States regarding disaster relief,16 it 
could potentially follow that neither the international community of 
States nor disaster-affected States have any responsibilities concerning 
humanitarian assistance for natural disasters. The lack of international 
legal obligations pertaining to disaster response is troubling, particularly 
when disaster-affected States delay or prevent the provision of relief or 
when the international community of States inadequately or improperly 
provides humanitarian assistance.17 Such situations have arisen in past 
disaster relief operations18 due to international law’s disregard for the 
 
ministrative, or support roles of governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-
governmental organizations. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 3–4; see also ROBERT 
F. GORMAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF REFUGEE AND DISASTER RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS 
48 (1994) (defining the term “humanitarian assistance” as “incorporating all forms of aid 
given to people in distress, without discrimination with regard to political origin, race, 
religion, or national origin”). 
 11. For the purposes of this Note, “States” refer to Nation-states. 
 12. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.ii. 
 13. Charles M. Wolfson, Katrina’s Impact on Foreign Policy, CBSNEWS.COM, Sept. 
9, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/09/opinion/diplomatic/main830306.sht 
ml. 
 14. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.ii. 
 15. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 16. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 56. 
 17. LYNN H. STEPHENS & STEPHEN J. GREEN, Conclusion: Progress, Problems and 
Predictions, in DISASTER ASSISTANCE: APPRAISAL, REFORM AND NEW APPROACHES 293, 
295 (Lynn H. Stephens & Stephen J. Green eds., 1979) (noting that a common theme 
among reports and studies on natural disasters concerned “the problems created in effec-
tively providing relief in natural disasters, when affected governments consciously delay 
or prevent the delivery of assistance”); see, e.g., discussion infra Part III.A. 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
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responsibilities of all States concerning humanitarian assistance for natu-
ral disasters.19
The Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina are perfect examples 
of catastrophic natural disasters that have exposed the imperfect state of 
international disaster relief. In particular, these disasters have revealed 
concerns pertaining to the provision of humanitarian assistance. They 
have raised issues concerning the general responsibilities of disaster-
affected States and the international community of States regarding natu-
ral disasters, such as: (1) whether all States have a responsibility to warn 
of impending disasters; (2) whether the international community of 
States has a responsibility to unconditionally provide humanitarian assis-
tance and whether disaster-affected States have a responsibility to accept 
needed disaster relief; and (3) whether all States have a responsibility to 
rebuild disaster-stricken communities.20 Issues relating to these responsi-
bilities are important because of the severity of natural disasters world-
wide21 and criticism regarding the inadequacy of disaster relief re-
sponses.22 International consensus on the legal responsibilities of all 
 
 19. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 56. 
 20. STEPHEN GREEN, INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF: TOWARD A RESPONSIVE 
SYSTEM 29–30 (Thomas Quinn & Michael Hennelly eds., 1977) (explaining the current 
international disaster relief system as consisting of four major elements: (1) the U.N.; (2) 
private organizations; (3) donor governments; and (4) the international media. These 
elements comprise a complex and chaotic disaster relief system that responds ad hoc to a 
multitude of natural disasters differing in geographical locations and circumstances.); see 
discussion infra Part III. 
 21. See OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. [OCHR], Fact Sheet No. 2 
(Rev. 1): The International Bill of Human Rights (June 1996), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm [hereinafter The International Bill of Hu-
man Rights]; GREEN, supra note 20, at 20–21 (expressing concern over the geographical 
distribution of natural disasters that occurred in the 1970s, which primarily hit developing 
regions of the world, such as poor countries with significant political, social, and eco-
nomic problems that are the least capable of single-handedly dealing with natural disas-
ters). 
 22. See, e.g., discussion infra Part III.A.2; see also David P. Forsythe, Diplomatic 
Approaches to the Political Problems of International Relief in Natural Disasters, in 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE: APPRAISAL, REFORM AND NEW APPROACHES, supra note 17, at 
267, 268 (highlighting some problems of international disaster relief and recognizing the 
need for its improvement). Forsythe quotes a 1977 U.S. Department of State Action 
Memo: 
The international “system” for disaster [relief] needs to be improved. It now 
suffers from bad coordination among national governments, voluntary agen-
cies, and UN bodies, as well as from political resistance within some countries 
to admit disaster or to distribute relief fast and equitably. 
Id. 
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States would help clarify the conceptual problems relating to State re-
sponsibilities with respect to disaster relief.23 International law should 
impose on all States certain responsibilities to foster international coop-
eration during relief operations and to ensure the effective provision of 
humanitarian assistance to disaster victims.24
Part II of this Note resolves doctrinal issues concerning State sover-
eignty and international human rights, which are relevant to disaster re-
lief operations. It describes the doctrine of State sovereignty and its evo-
lution as a result of the emerging recognition of international human 
rights. It further explains two theories that have surfaced in the context of 
humanitarian intervention:25 “the forfeiture of sovereignty” and “the re-
sponsibility to protect.” These theories attempt to resolve the tension be-
tween sovereignty and international human rights. Part III addresses how 
the doctrine of “the responsibility to protect” can be applied to natural 
disasters. It highlights criticisms of prior disaster relief efforts and dem-
onstrates instances where disaster-affected States and the international 
community of States embraced certain responsibilities—before, during, 
and after natural disasters occurred—despite the lack of any imposed 
legal obligations.26 It exemplifies how the responsibility to protect ap-
plies to natural disasters, but recognizes the difficulty in finding legal 
authority for this assertion. Part IV argues that recognizing the human 
rights of disaster victims within international human rights law is essen-
tial to promoting the responsibility to protect doctrine, and justifying its 
 
 23. J.W. Samuels, The Relevance of International Law in the Prevention and Mitiga-
tion of Natural Disasters, in DISASTER ASSISTANCE: APPRAISAL, REFORM AND NEW 
APPROACHES, supra note 17, at 247–48 (stating that the approach by the U.N. Disaster 
Relief Organization and the International Red Cross Movement to establish a regulatory 
system for disaster relief neglects to mention the State’s obligation to provide and accept 
relief). 
 24. Id. at 250 (recognizing the need to establish the general principles of disaster re-
lief before developing detailed law concerning its operational aspects). 
 25. While this Note focuses on humanitarian assistance for natural disasters, it is nec-
essary to assess theories that attempt to assimilate sovereignty and human rights under 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention because they are relevant to the discourse re-
garding humanitarian assistance during natural disasters. 
 26. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that legal instruments, in the form 
of multilateral and bilateral declarations, resolutions, and treaties, have had an insuffi-
cient impact on international relief operations, and recognizing the necessity of evaluat-
ing the international humanitarian activities of States, government organizations, private 
agencies, and other international actors during disaster relief operations to assess the 
developing standards regarding the international community’s responsibility towards 
disaster victims). 
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applicability to natural disasters.27 It proposes codifying the rights of 
natural disaster victims to create legal obligations on all States with re-
spect to disaster relief. Part V posits that an international disaster relief 
treaty, premised on the responsibility of all States to protect the rights of 
natural disaster victims, would foster international cooperation during 
disaster relief operations. This agreement would promote a more effec-
tive system of international disaster relief.28
II. SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RESOLVING THE TENSION 
A. The Evolving Doctrine of State Sovereignty 
The doctrine of State sovereignty is “an almost sacred principle”29 that 
is a fundamental concept of international law.30 According to the doc-
trine of sovereignty, States are independent entities that can exercise su-
preme political authority over their territory. States can control move-
ment across their borders, independently make foreign policy choices, 
and reject unwanted intrusion by other States.31 Under the traditional 
view of sovereignty, States may shape and determine their own policies 
with respect to the treatment of their citizens and control over their do-
mestic affairs without interference from other States.32
 
 27. Richard H. Ullman, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF: TOWARD A 
RESPONSIVE SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 1, 3 (recognizing the viability of regarding the 
provision of disaster relief as a human right by focusing on the right of all people to re-
ceive satisfaction of their basic survival needs). 
 28. GREEN, supra note 20, at 12–14 (noting that the problem with international disas-
ter relief operations is that they do not always adequately respond to the needs and inter-
ests of disaster victims, and suggesting that laws, such as international treaties, may im-
prove the protection of disaster victims because such laws could address fundamental 
management problems during relief operations). 
 29. Nancy D. Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention: When Do Humani-
tarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, 200 (1993). 
 30. Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Remarks to the School of For-
eign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies: Sovereignty: Existing 
Rights, Evolving Responsibilities (June 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/16648.htm (arguing that for over two centuries, the 
doctrine of sovereignty has fostered the emergence of representative governments, “the 
formation of international organizations, and the development of international law”). 
 31. Id.; David J. Scheffer, Toward a Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 253, 259–60 (1992); GORMAN, supra note 10, at 58 (defining “sovereignty” 
as a basic principle that “confers on recognized [S]tates the right to conduct their domes-
tic and foreign policies without interference from the outside. It calls for [S]tates to rec-
ognize their mutual territorial integrity and independence. It allows [S]tates to limit them-
selves, but not to be limited against their will by other [S]tates.”). 
 32. Arnison, supra note 29, at 202. 
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This traditional understanding of sovereignty has changed considerably 
due to decolonization following World War II, the establishment of the 
United Nations (U.N.), and the U.N. Charter’s introduction of the right to 
self-determination in 1951.33 These events have transformed the tradi-
tional view of sovereignty into a more modern view of sovereignty that 
acknowledges the sovereign status of States as conditional upon those 
States recognizing obligations to their people.34 Currently, international 
law recognizes the more modern view of sovereignty as “the people’s 
sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s sovereignty.”35
B. The Development of International Human Rights 
The U.N. Charter obligates U.N. Member States (Member States) “to 
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for 
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55,” which promotes 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.36 Although the U.N. 
Charter has not expounded upon what these rights and freedoms entail, it 
has compelled Member States to promote the concept of human rights 
for all people.37
 
 33. Michael J. Struett, The Transformation of State Sovereign Rights and Responsi-
bilities Under the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 
179, 182 (2005); see also Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Owner-
ship of Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 49 
(2006). 
 34. Duruigbo, supra note 33, at 49; see also INT’L COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION & 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY [ICISS], THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 7, ¶ 1.33 (Int’l Dev. Res. 
Centre) (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf [hereinafter 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT]. 
 35. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 869 (1990); see also Scheffer, supra note 31, at 260 
(explaining how the concept of sovereignty has evolved into one that is not solely prem-
ised on the power of States, but considers sovereignty powers in other international actors 
such as ethnic groups, refugees, displaced people, and regional and international organi-
zations. The evolution of sovereignty has occurred, in part, as a result of the emergence 
of a multitude of international treaties and conventions fostering the protection of human 
rights at the expense of limiting national sovereignty.). Furthermore, the emergence of 
the U.N. as an international diplomatic authority has played a huge part in fueling the 
evolving concept of sovereignty among the international community. Mithi Mukherjee, 
Justice, War, and the Imperium: India and Britain in Edmund Burke’s Prosecutorial 
Speeches in the Impeachment Trial of Warren Hastings, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 589, 593 
(2005). 
 36. U.N. Charter art. 55–56. 
 37. Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War 
Crimes and Human Rights Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal 
Court, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 405, 433 (2005). 
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On December 10, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly (General Assem-
bly) confirmed its pledge to human rights by adopting the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (UDHR).38 The UDHR provides an exhaustive 
list of civil and political rights, including: the right to life, liberty, and 
security; the right not to be held in slavery; and the right to freedom of 
movement and residence.39 Scholars have argued that the UDHR, though 
adopted as a non-binding resolution, has been accepted as customary in-
ternational law,40 thus representing legal obligations developed from the 
general acceptance and consistent practice of States.41
In addition to the UDHR, the General Assembly adopted a series of 
U.N. Human Rights Covenants in 1966, which include the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),42 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),43 the Op-
tional Protocol to the ICCPR, and the Second Optional Protocol to the 
 
 38. The General Assembly approved the UDHR upon the recommendation of the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission. The UDHR was the first worldwide endeavor to iden-
tify human rights standards. GORMAN, supra note 10, at 124. 
 39. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 40. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing 
that certain rights, such as the right to be free from torture, have become part of custom-
ary international law under the UDHR); see also GORMAN, supra note 10, at 124 (con-
tending that although the UDHR is not legally binding, the UDHR has established human 
rights norms that many States have incorporated into their constitutions or statutes, 
thereby granting the UDHR domestic legal significance); Reisman, supra note 35, at 869 
(asserting that the UDHR has acquired customary international law status and its ideals 
are upheld by several regional agreements). 
 41. See Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38(1)(b) (stating that “a general practice accepted as 
law” is international custom); MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 53 (1985) (explaining 
that the “creation of a customary rule requires both the existence of a general practice of 
States and a second constitutive element which is the opinio juris, or the acceptance by 
States of the practice as law”); Michael Y. Kieval, Note, Be Reasonable! Thoughts on the 
Effectiveness of State Criticism in Enforcing International Law, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 
872–73 (2005) (explaining that customary international law results from established 
norms that have evolved from State practice). 
 42. The ICCPR reiterated the following rights: the freedom of movement, the right to 
be recognized as persons before the law, the freedom of religious and political expres-
sion, and the right to nondiscrimination. GORMAN, supra note 10, at 113. 
 43. The ICESCR emphasized the right to have a “healthier, safer, and more satisfying 
life.” Such a right includes: to be free from hunger, to subsistence, to work, to have safe 
and healthy working conditions, to join unions, to social security, to primary education, 
and to undertake in cultural life. Id. at 113–14. 
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ICCPR.44 The adoption of these covenants codified individual human 
rights principles.45
Collectively, the U.N. Charter, the UDHR, and the U.N. Human Rights 
Covenants, comprise an International Bill of Human Rights,46 which 
provides a human rights framework for the international community. 
While the acknowledgment and significance of specific human rights 
may vary among individual States,47 the general respect for the principle 
of international human rights has made it a universally accepted norm 
under customary international law.48
C. Resolving the Tension: The Forfeiture of Sovereignty and the Respon-
sibility to Protect 
The escalating concern over catastrophic natural disasters and the lack 
of clarity pertaining to States’ responsibilities to disaster-stricken peo-
ple49 necessitates assessing the assimilation of two principles: sover-
eignty and human rights.50 Despite worldwide concern over natural dis-
asters, the international community is still fundamentally comprised of 
sovereign States whose primary concern is to safeguard their sover-
eignty.51 Herein arises the dilemma. When disaster-affected States are 
 
 44. The International Bill of Human Rights, supra note 21. 
 45. GORMAN, supra note 10, at 124 (explaining that the adoption of the ICCPR, Pro-
tocol to the ICCPR, and the ICESCR were efforts to codify and enforce human rights 
principles). 
 46. See Jimmy Carter, Foreword to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS at 
ix–xi (Paul Williams ed., 1981) (describing the International Bill of Human Rights as a 
“universal demand for fundamental human rights”); Peter Meyer, The International Bill: 
A Brief History, in id. at xxiii, xlv; Robin Geiss, Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic 
Sanctions Regimes: A Call for Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and 
Follow-up Assessment of Long-Term Effects, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 167, 178 n.63 
(2005); Amnesty International, The International Bill of Human Rights, 
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/apro/aproweb.nsf/pages/bill (last visited Nov. 18, 2005). 
 47. See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL 
INT’L L. J. 429, 447 n.60 (1997). 
 48. See GORMAN, supra note 10, at 47–48. 
 49. See Hyogo Framework for Action, supra note 3, at 6. 
 50. Samuels, supra note 23, at 263 (noting the misunderstanding and need for resolu-
tion regarding issues arising from the obligation of governments to provide relief and the 
obligation of other governments to receive relief). 
 51. See, e.g., Tampere Gives Birth to a New Convention, supra note 6, at 39, 49 (not-
ing that certain countries raised concerns about the possible loss of sovereignty with the 
ratification of the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Re-
sources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (Tampere Convention), an interna-
tional treaty lowering regulatory barriers to facilitate telecommunications equipment and 
personnel in the aftermath of a disaster); see also discussion infra Part IV.B for more 
information about the Tampere Convention. 
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either unable or unwilling to provide adequate relief to disaster victims, 
the international community of States must be able to provide humanitar-
ian assistance without compromising the sovereignty of disaster-affected 
States.52 The examples proffered throughout this Note demonstrate that 
this is not always the case. 
Many theories have emerged to reconcile State sovereignty with hu-
man rights in justifying humanitarian intervention: the right of foreign 
States and international organizations to take intervening and coercive 
action, specifically military action, in a State’s domestic affairs if its citi-
zens are being subject to treatment that “shocks the conscience of man-
kind.”53 Two theories: “the forfeiture of sovereignty” and “the responsi-
bility to protect” deserve recognition because they justify humanitarian 
assistance during natural disaster relief operations. 
According to the forfeiture of sovereignty,54 a State temporarily for-
feits its sovereignty when it allows gross violations of human rights to 
occur, thus contravening its citizens’ rights.55
[W]here the government is not in control or the controlling authority is 
unable or unwilling to create the conditions necessary to ensure rights, 
and gross violations of the rights of masses of people result, sover-
eignty in the sense of responsible government is forfeited and the inter-
national community must provide the needed protection and assis-
tance.56
 
 52. Samuels, supra note 23, at 248–49. 
 53. GORMAN, supra note 10, at 48 (defining “humanitarian intervention” as a contro-
versial legal doctrine referring to the right of a [S]tate . . . to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of another [S]tate to prevent it from persisting in flagrant abuse of its own popula-
tion . . . [such as] persistently violat[ing] the rights of its citizens . . . in a way that ‘shocks 
the conscience of mankind’”). 
 54. The forfeiture of sovereignty theory is also known as the “theory of conditional 
sovereignty” or the “temporary surrender of sovereignty.” Mohamad Y. Mattar, State 
Responsibilities in Combating Trafficking in Persons in Central Asia, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 145, 212–13 (2005). 
 55. Id. at 212; Michael L. Burton, Note, Legalizing the Sublegal: A Proposal for 
Codifying a Doctrine of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 85 GEO. L. J. 417, 435–36 
(1996) (noting that “a [S]tate is endowed with a defeasible right of sovereignty, contin-
gent upon some minimum standard of treatment of its subjects. Should [S]tate action fall 
below this threshold—for example, by flagrantly violating the human rights of those 
within its borders—the [S]tate forfeits its sovereignty entirely and thus becomes subject 
to external intervention.”). 
 56. Elizabeth E. Ruddick, The Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty: International 
Law, International Protection, and the Internally Displaced, 77 B.U. L. REV. 429, 462 
(1997) (quoting FRANCIS M. DENG, PROTECTING THE DISPOSSESSED 135 (1993)). 
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This theory maintains that a State’s primary obligation is to protect its 
citizens. When the State cannot—thereby allowing severe human rights 
violations to ensue against its people—the State’s sovereignty is deemed 
forfeited.57 The forfeiture of sovereignty views a State’s sovereign status 
as conditional upon its ability to protect the human rights of its people.58 
Under this theory, intervention from the international community of 
States is acceptable when a State is perceived to have forfeited its sover-
eignty by violating human rights.59
The second theory is the responsibility to protect.60 The International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)61 proposed 
this theory, which is a more positive version of the forfeiture of sover-
eignty because it reconciles, rather than surrenders, sovereignty with re-
sponsibility. Such reconciliation becomes evident from assessing the de-
velopment of the concept of “State responsibility” and its emergence 
among the international community. 
The responsibility to protect developed from the State responsibility 
concept, which the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)62 established in 
the Corfu Channel Case in 1949.63 The I.C.J.’s judgment recognized in-
 
 57. Ruddick, supra note 56, at 462. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See generally THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34. 
 61. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien instituted the ICISS at the U.N. Millen-
nium Summit in September 2000. Jeremy I. Levitt, The Responsibility to Protect: A Bea-
ver Without a Dam?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 153, 156 (2003). The function of the ICISS 
was: 
[T]o wrestle with the whole range of questions—legal, moral, operational and 
political—rolled up in this debate, to consult with the widest possible range of 
opinion around the world, and to bring back a report [to] help the Secretary-
General and everyone else find some new common ground. 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34, at vii. 
 62. The I.C.J. is the principal judicial organ of the U.N. It consists of fifteen judges 
who settle legal disputes between States, in accordance with international law, and pro-
vides advisory opinions on legal issues from international organs and agencies. Note on 
the International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjg 
nnot.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2005). 
 63. The Corfu Channel Case, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9). In this case, two 
British cruisers and two destroyers were traveling in the North Corfu Strait, which was 
considered Albanian waters. One of the destroyers, the Saumarez, struck a mine. The 
other destroyer, the Volage, came to the assistance of the Saumarez and, while towing it, 
struck another mine. This accident resulted in damage to both destroyers, the deaths of 
forty-five British officers and sailors, and injury to forty-two other people. The I.C.J. held 
Albania liable for its failure to warn of the mines, about which it should have known, 
located in its territory. Id. at 12–13, 118. 
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ternational obligations towards humanity that exist during peacetime and 
during war.64 Subsequently, the U.N. acknowledged the importance of 
State responsibility65 from the International Law Commission’s (ILC)66 
Draft Articles on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts (ILC’s Draft Articles),67 which brought State responsibility to the 
international community’s attention.68 The ILC’s Draft Articles state, in 
pertinent part, “[e]very internationally wrongful act [or omission] of a 
State entails the international responsibility of that State.”69 Under this 
rationale, since respect for human rights is a State obligation under cus-
tomary international law,70 it is a logical inference that States have an 
international responsibility not to allow violations of human rights to 
occur in their territories. Otherwise, they have committed an internation-
ally wrongful act. Therefore, international human rights law has chal-
lenged the traditional understanding of State sovereignty by reinforcing a 
concept of sovereignty that imposes on States the responsibility to pro-
tect human rights.71
 
 64. Id. at 22. Although international law does not recognize the principle of stare 
decisis, the Corfu Channel Case has generally been viewed as a source of the State re-
sponsibility concept. Devereaux F. McClatchey, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade 
Later: The Evolution of State Responsibility for International Disasters, 1986-1996, 25 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 659, 665 (1996). 
 65. G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). Prior to this recogni-
tion, the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan “challenged Member States to resolve the 
conflict between the principle of non-interference regarding state sovereignty and the 
responsibility of the international community to respond to massive human rights viola-
tions and ethnic cleansing” during his addresses to the General Assembly in 1999 and 
2000. WORLD FEDERALIST MOVEMENT-INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL POL’Y, RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE (2006), available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/features/556?theme=alt5. 
 66. The ILC is composed of thirty-four members who are elected by the General As-
sembly to “encourag[e] the progressive development of international law and its codifica-
tion.” International Law Commission: Introduction, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/introfra. 
htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2007); U.N. Charter art. 13(1). 
 67. See G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, supra note 65. 
 68. G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 65, at 2, ¶ 3. 
 69. G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, supra note 65, at 2, art. 1. 
 70. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 71. Louis Henkin, An Agenda for the Next Century: The Myth and Mantra of State 
Sovereignty, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 115, 118 (1994) (acknowledging that “[h]alf a century of 
human rights law has washed away notions that how a [S]tate treats its inhabitants is 
nobody else’s business, is within its domestic jurisdiction, is within the [S]tate’s exclu-
sive power which is the ‘very essence of’ sovereignty”); see also Vesselin Popovski, 
Essay: Sovereignty as Duty to Protect Human Rights, UN CHRON. ONLINE EDITION, 
http:/www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue4/0404p16.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005). 
Popovski writes: 
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The ICISS report further elaborated on the notion of State responsibil-
ity by presenting the concept of the responsibility to protect: 
[T]he idea that sovereign [S]tates have a responsibility to protect their 
own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, 
from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, 
that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of 
[S]tates.72
The report redefines the view of humanitarian intervention from the 
right to intervene into the responsibility to protect,73 thus refocusing hu-
manitarian intervention on “the rights of affected populations and the 
obligations of outsiders to help.”74 The ICISS report elaborates two basic 
principles of the responsibility to protect: 
[First,] State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary re-
sponsibility for the protection of its people lies with the [S]tate itself. 
[Second,] [w]here a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of 
internal war, insurgency, repression or [S]tate failure, and the [S]tate in 
 
A State cannot pretend absolute sovereignty without demonstrating a duty to 
protect people’s rights . . . . When Governments fail to protect human rights . . . 
the international community can intervene and exercise an extraterritorial duty 
to protect people at risk. The principle of sovereignty is not denied by such in-
tervention; it refocuses from being an absolute control over certain territory to 
being a responsibility to govern in a certain manner. The sovereignty of States 
. . . depends on their duty when governing to respect human beings. The sover-
eignty of States means the sovereignty of people, not of leaders. 
Id.; Katja Luopajärvi, Is There an Obligation on States to Accept International Humani-
tarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Under International Law?, 15 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 678, 684 (2003) (highlighting Mr. Francis Deng’s, the Representative of the 
U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, support for the State responsi-
bility concept. Deng argues that responsible sovereign powers ensure respect for and 
protection of fundamental human rights, and under exceptional circumstances when gov-
ernments cannot fulfill that responsibility, the international community has an obligation 
to step in and provide a remedy for those who are suffering.). 
 72. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34, at viii. 
 73. Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Interven-
tion, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 78, 81 (2004) (explaining that the responsibility to 
protect is an obligation owed by all sovereign States to their citizens, which must be as-
sumed by the international community of States if sovereign States fail to live up to that 
responsibility); Levitt, supra note 61, at 155 (noting that the ICISS report focuses on the 
obligations of States, as opposed to the rights of States). 
 74. Levitt, supra note 61, at 155 (quoting Thomas G. Weiss, To Intervene or Not to 
Intervene? A Contemporary Snap-Shot, CANADIAN FOREIGN POL’Y 141, 146 (2002)). 
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question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.75
The ICISS report explains the responsibility to protect as embracing 
three responsibilities: 
1. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and 
direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting 
populations at risk. 
2. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling 
human need with appropriate measures, which may include coer-
cive measures like sanction and international prosecution, and in 
extreme cases military intervention. 
3. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a mili-
tary intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and 
reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention 
was designed to halt or avert.76 
The responsibility to protect encompasses three State responsibilities: 
the responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild, which the U.N. Sec-
retary-General Kofi Annan urged Member States to embrace “as a basis 
for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.”77 While the ICISS report discusses the responsibility 
 
 75. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34, at xi. The ICISS report also 
reads: 
The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the 
international community of [S]tates, lie in: obligations inherent in the concept 
of sovereignty; the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of 
the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; spe-
cific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, 
covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; the de-
veloping practice of [S]tates, regional organizations and the Security Council 
itself. 
Id. 
 76. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34, at xi. 
 77. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, 59, ¶ 135, follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, 
U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom]. The Secretary-
General Kofi Annan writes: 
I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when neces-
sary, we must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each 
individual State, whose primary raison d’être and duty is to protect its popula-
tion. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, 
then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, 
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to protect under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention—military in-
tervention during situations of gross human rights violations—it would 
be logical to apply this concept to humanitarian assistance—relief efforts 
provided for disaster-stricken countries. Applying the responsibility to 
protect to natural disasters is a novel idea, as much of the legal scholar-
ship regarding State responsibility discusses State responsibility to inter-
vene under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention78 and State respon-
sibility for international man-made disasters.79
 
humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-
being of civilian populations. 
Id. at 35, ¶ 135. 
 78. See Scheffer, supra note 31, at 264. Scheffer writes: 
The classical definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’ is limited to those in-
stances in which a nation unilaterally uses military force to intervene in the ter-
ritory of another [S]tate for the purpose of protecting a sizable group of indige-
nous people from life-threatening or otherwise unconscionable infractions of 
their human rights that the national government inflicts or in which it acqui-
esces. 
Id. The concept of State responsibility has recently been addressed in the context of in-
ternally displaced persons, which are: 
[P]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to 
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or 
in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized vio-
lence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who 
have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter The Guiding Principles]. While pro-
tection of civilians during natural disasters is included in The Guiding Principles, recog-
nition of the responsibility to protect human rights has primarily been discussed in situa-
tions of armed conflict and generalized violence, but is inadequately addressed in the area 
of natural disasters. INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES 
[IFRCRCS], INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE LAWS, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE: 
REFLECTIONS, PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 65 (2003) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL 
DISASTER RESPONSE LAWS]. But cf. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral on Protection for Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees and Others in Conflict Situa-
tions, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/883 (Sept. 22, 1998) (noting 
the importance and urgency of addressing the issue of humanitarian assistance to refu-
gees, displaced persons, and victims of conflict situations). 
 79. See generally McClatchey, supra note 64 (noting that the international commu-
nity addressed the concept of State responsibility in the aftermath of two well-known 
man-made environmental disasters: the Chernobyl explosion in the former Soviet Union 
and the Sandoz spill in Switzerland); Am. Soc’y of Int’l L. [ASIL], International Respon-
sibility for Manmade Disasters, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 320 (1990) (providing a 
summary of a discussion among legal scholars regarding three aspects of government 
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This Note proposes that all States, disaster-affected States and the in-
ternational community of States, have a responsibility to humanity when 
natural disasters occur. Applying the responsibility to protect to natural 
disasters would highlight the following responsibilities befalling on all 
States: (1) to warn people and nations potentially affected by an impend-
ing or occurring disaster; (2) to unconditionally provide essential disaster 
relief and accept it if needed; and (3) to ensure sustainable reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of disaster-affected areas. Further clarification of how 
these responsibilities play out in the context of past natural disasters 
demonstrates the plausibility of applying the responsibility to protect to 
the provision of humanitarian assistance in natural disaster situations. 
III. WHEN DISASTER STRIKES 
A. Empirical Examples: The Responsibility to Protect in Natural Disas-
ters 
State sovereignty is fundamental to international disaster relief opera-
tions.80 When natural disasters strike, disaster-affected States have the 
authority to manage all aspects of the disaster’s aftermath by either re-
questing or refusing aid from the international community of States.81 
Disaster-affected States may reject assistance for a variety of political 
reasons, such as, “the embarrassment and dependency implicit in asking 
the outside (usually the West) for help,”82 which consequently exposes 
the disaster-affected States’ incompetence in effectively responding to 
 
responsibility for transnational man-made disasters: (1) State responsibility to prevent 
disasters; (2) State responsibility to mitigate damages after a disaster has occurred or is 
imminent; and (3) State responsibility for the payment of damages); Sudhir K. Chopra, 
Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need for a New Comprehen-
sive Global Regime for Transnational Corporate Activity, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 235 (1994) 
(explaining the factual situations of the industrial disasters that occurred in Bhopal, India; 
Seveso and Meda, Italy; the former Soviet Union; and Basel, Switzerland. Chopra as-
sesses the adequacy of the legal responses to these disasters and recognizes the need for 
an international legal regime to regulate multinational corporate activity to prevent future 
industrial disasters.). 
 80. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 55 (1985) (stating that respect for the sover-
eignty of States and protection of their freedom of action are essential tenets applicable to 
relief actions). 
 81. Id. at 56 (noting that under international law, there is neither a legal obligation on 
States to offer disaster relief to other countries nor an obligation on States to respond to 
requests for help). 
 82. Ellen Freudenheim, Politics in International Disasters: Fact, Not Fiction, in 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE: APPRAISAL, REFORM AND NEW APPROACHES, supra note 17, at 
225, 241. 
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natural disasters.83 Political motivations significantly influence how dis-
aster-affected States choose to respond to disaster relief offers.84 For ex-
ample, political factors may delay disaster-affected States’ acknowl-
edgement that a natural disaster has occurred, as well as the full extent of 
its effects,85 thereby hindering the provision of relief to disaster vic-
tims.86 Herein lies the problem. Ensuring the adequate protection of natu-
 
 83. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 72 (explaining that similar to other emer-
gency situations, natural disasters draw attention to a disaster-affected State’s compe-
tence and authority in responding to the adverse effects of such disasters within its terri-
tory). 
 84. Freudenheim, supra note 82, at 228. Freudenheim identifies four major political 
problems: (1) domestic politics, wherein “domestic politics in the disaster-stricken coun-
try obstruct formal acknowledgement of the disaster, and/or obstruct disaster prepared-
ness, relief and rehabilitative measures;” (2) domestic corruption, wherein “corruption in 
the disaster-stricken country leads to inflated assessments of the disaster damage, and 
misallocation of relief goods;” (3) rejection of aid, wherein “the government of the disas-
ter-stricken country rejects offers of governmental foreign aid for political reasons;” and 
(4) international politics, wherein “international politics obstruct disaster preparedness, 
relief or rehabilitation.” Id.; see also Ullman, supra note 27, at 5 (listing political reasons 
for why those in power may impede disaster relief: to prolong incumbency; to cover up 
government incompetence; to conceal disagreeable domestic conditions that could hinder 
tourism, trade, and foreign financial transactions; and to undermine domestic opposition). 
 85. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 73; Ullman, supra note 27, at 1 (explaining 
that the governments of disaster-stricken States may be unwilling to acknowledge, to 
their own people and the international community of States, the magnitude of a disaster’s 
effects on their territory for both domestic and international political reasons. Govern-
ments exhibiting this conduct intensify the devastation and suffering of natural disaster 
victims.). 
 86. See Freudenheim, supra note 82, at 241 (noting that “[u]nfortunately, without the 
government’s acknowledgement that it needs help, the foreign aid mechanisms of other 
governments and international agencies (with the important exception of the voluntary 
agencies) are immobilized”); see also GREEN, supra note 20, at 12 (noting that disaster-
affected governments may make politically motivated decisions that are harmful to disas-
ter victims. In effect, these decisions have “denied the existence of a disaster[,] . . . 
steered relief to one ethnic group rather than another[,] . . . given aid on the basis of per-
ceived diplomatic benefits rather than according to the needs of the victims, [and allowed 
governments to profit] enormously from the sale of relief goods.”); Zama Coursen-Neff, 
Preventative Measures Pertaining to Unconventional Threats to the Peace Such as Natu-
ral and Humanitarian Disasters, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 645, 650–51 n.19 (1998) 
(noting that mass human suffering is not always less political in natural disasters than in 
conflict situations. “The cholera epidemic in Guinea (1969), the tidal wave and floods in 
East Pakistan (1970), the early and middle stages of the drought in the Sahel (1968-
1972), the Ethiopian famine and cholera epidemic (1973), the famines in India and Haiti 
(1975), and the Philippine earthquake (1976) are but a few of the disasters in which po-
litically prompted official resistance prevented or delayed relief operations.”). 
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ral disaster victims may be in peril87 because international law does not 
impose any legal obligations on States regarding disaster prevention, re-
lief, and recovery.88 Therefore, when disaster-affected States alone can-
not adequately protect their disaster-stricken populations—when they are 
unable or unwilling to provide relief—then intervention from the interna-
tional community of States in the form of humanitarian assistance be-
comes necessary to protect the livelihoods of natural disaster victims.89
Although there are no established, universal guidelines regarding 
States’ actions during times of natural disasters,90 past disasters have 
highlighted certain responsibilities of disaster-affected States and the 
international community of States before, during, and after natural disas-
ters occur.91 Applying the responsibility to protect to natural disaster 
situations illuminates these responsibilities, which include: (1) the re-
sponsibility to prevent, which is the responsibility of disaster-affected 
States and the international community of States to warn people and 
other regions that may be affected by an impending natural disaster; (2) 
the responsibility to react, which is the responsibility of disaster-affected 
States to accept needed humanitarian relief from the international com-
munity of States, particularly when they are unable or unwilling to effec-
tively provide relief within their territory, and the concurrent responsibil-
ity of the international community of States to provide humanitarian as-
sistance to disaster-affected States by offering relief goods, funding, ser-
 
 87. Id. at 13–14 (noting that “the international disaster relief system does not always 
serve well the interests of disaster-stricken countries and their people”). 
 88. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 56. 
 89. Id. at 52 (explaining that when States alone cannot ensure effective and adequate 
protection of disaster victims within their territory, international actions are often taken to 
ensure the sufficient protection of disaster-stricken populations). 
 90. Samuels, supra note 23, at 263–64 (noting that the legal system for ensuring the 
practice of disaster relief assistance between States is weak. However, the progress made 
by the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) and the International Red Cross 
Movement regarding the codification of disaster relief practices provides some optimism 
for developing international disaster relief laws.); see generally INTERNATIONAL 
DISASTER RESPONSE LAWS, supra note 78 (The IFRCRCS initiated the International Dis-
aster Response Law Project (IDRL Project) to analyze the various international laws, 
principles, and practices relating to international disaster response. The IFRCRCS recog-
nized that unlike the detailed and well-recognized provisions for protection and assis-
tance under international humanitarian law during times of armed conflict, there is a lack 
of an identifiable systematic source of law for humanitarian assistance during times of 
natural disasters. The IDRL Project is a valuable step towards improving the effective-
ness of disaster relief operations.); MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 165 (noting the 
important role of the UNDRO in strengthening and improving the coordination of hu-
manitarian assistance). 
 91. See discussion infra Part III.A.1–3. 
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vices, and personnel; and (3) the responsibility to rebuild, which is the 
responsibility of disaster-affected States and the international community 
of States to work collectively towards rebuilding disaster-stricken com-
munities. 
1. The Responsibility to Prevent 
The first prong of the ICISS’ three-fold responsibility is the responsi-
bility to prevent: the “[p]revention of deadly conflict and other forms of 
man-made catastrophe.”92 In the context of natural disasters, since pre-
vention requires warning, it would be logical to interpret the responsibil-
ity to prevent as encompassing the responsibility to warn. The responsi-
bility to warn would include taking preventative measures to mitigate the 
consequences of natural disasters.93 The duty to warn of an impending 
disaster is not a new concept, particularly in the context of man-made 
disasters, such as the Chernobyl explosion94 and the Sandoz spill95 in 
1986. Neither of the offending States, the former Soviet Union nor Swit-
zerland, faced legal consequences for their failure to notify adversely 
affected neighboring States.96 However, these incidents have raised 
awareness among legal scholars concerning the responsibility of disaster-
 
 92. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34, ¶ 3.2. 
 93. GREEN, supra note 20, at 27 (explaining that the concept of disaster prevention 
means that if “properly warned, properly prepared, [and] properly situated and housed, 
mankind can mitigate the worst effects of natural [disasters] that otherwise would involve 
great loss of life and suffering”). 
 94. On April 26, 1986, a nuclear reactor in Chernobyl, U.S.S.R. exploded, which 
resulted in the release of an overwhelming amount of radioactive emissions into the at-
mosphere that spread throughout the Soviet Republic and Europe. Long-term cancer 
deaths from this nuclear accident ranged from 14,000 to 475,000 people. Outside of the 
Soviet Union, the nuclear explosion adversely affected about 600,000 people. 
McClatchey, supra note 64, at 661. 
 95. On November 1, 1986, a fire broke out in a chemical warehouse in Switzerland. 
The water used by the firefighters to combat the fire, about 10,000 to 15,000 cubic meters 
of chemically-infested water, oozed into the Rhine River via the sewer system, resulting 
in a toxic cloud developing above the Rhine River. This incident caused the destruction 
of all the flora and fauna in the Rhine, set back the environmental renewal of the river, 
shut down water supply plants along the Rhine in France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
and West Germany, and killed livestock in France and Germany. Id. at 662. 
 96. McClatchey, supra note 64, at 664 (noting that claims were not brought against 
Switzerland partly because of deficiencies in international law at the time regarding State 
responsibility and lack of enforcement mechanisms in treaties governing the Rhine 
River). 
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affected States to notify other States of impending disasters causing 
transnational harm.97
Additionally, prior international case law has addressed the duty to 
warn. Some scholars have broadly interpreted the I.C.J.’s ruling in the 
Corfu Channel Case as providing that all States have a general duty to 
warn other States of potential or impending harm.98 Other scholars have 
limitedly construed the I.C.J.’s holding in contending that the duty “not 
to allow knowingly [their] territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other [S]tates” imposes a duty to warn only on disaster-affected 
States, where the danger is located within their territory.99 Regardless of 
these variant views’ interpretation of the I.C.J.’s opinion, the Corfu 
Channel Case serves as a building block for the emergence of the duty to 
warn concept.100 Due to prior international man-made disasters and case 
law addressing these events, the responsibility of all States to prevent, or 
mitigate, harms by warning of impending disasters has become well-
recognized. The Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrates how this responsi-
bility to warn materializes in a natural disaster. 
i. Indian Ocean Tsunami 
On December 26, 2004, an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter 
scale triggered a massive and powerful tsunami across the Indian 
Ocean.101 The tsunami struck northern Sumatra; the west coasts of Thai-
 
 97. See id. at 659 (noting that as a result of the Chernobyl and Sandoz incidents, “the 
past decade has witnessed a concerted effort among international declarations, scholars in 
international law, and [S]tates as reflected in international treaties to impose more duties 
upon [S]tates to assist and notify other [S]tates in the event of environmental catastro-
phes”). 
 98. Hand, supra note 2; see also case cited supra note 63. 
 99. McClatchey, supra note 64, at 664–65 (explaining that many legal scholars have 
recognized the I.C.J.’s prudence in not declaring an all-encompassing duty to warn). 
 100. Id. (noting that the I.C.J.’s decision in the Corfu Channel Case, which has been 
cited as a source for the State responsibility concept, is a foundational element for docu-
ments that embrace a general duty to warn, such as the ILC’s Draft Articles and the Rio 
Declaration). 
 101. Strengthening Emergency Relief, supra note 8, at 2, ¶ 2. The Secretary-General’s 
Report defines the tsunami crisis, describes the initial response from disaster-affected 
countries and the international community of States, and outlines the lessons learned 
from this catastrophic multinational disaster. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote: 
The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster created one of the most complex coordina-
tion and logistical challenges the disaster response system of the United Na-
tions has ever had to manage. The timing and scale of the event required quick 
and flexible coordination efforts in a variety of countries and contexts, and its 
global reach led to a proliferation of relief actions and actors and garnered as-
sistance from public, private and government sources at the highest levels. 
2007] THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 683 
                                                                                                            
land, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka; the east coast of India; the Maldives; and 
northern Africa.102 As of June 21, 2005, the tsunami had resulted in the 
deaths of approximately 240,000 people and displacement of more than 
one-million people.103
As a repercussion of the tsunami disaster, European survivors and rela-
tives of the victims brought a class action suit against the Pacific Tsu-
nami Warning Center, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA), the Accor Group (Accor), a French hotel chain 
with beach resorts in Thailand, and the Kingdom of Thailand for their 
failure to establish or properly use warning systems for natural disas-
ters.104 The Complaint alleges, inter alia, that Thailand had a duty to no-
tify countries of the tsunami because it possessed adequate information 
of the deadly waves and the waves’ direction prior to the disaster’s oc-
currence.105 Specifically, the Petitioners argue that Thailand should have 
alerted the affected countries through media or other telecommunications 
means and evacuated Thailand’s beach areas.106
This alleged duty to warn applies to natural disasters. There is a con-
siderable amount of scholarship suggesting that governments, businesses, 
and individuals have a duty to prepare for hazardous events, many of 
which are highly unpredictable, such as tsunamis, meteor strikes, and 
earthquakes.107 In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the interna-
 
While such global attention and support has been both welcome and construc-
tive, the high-intensity environment it has created has raised expectations of 
performance and accountability. 
Id. at 6, ¶ 17. 
 102. Id. at 2, ¶ 2. 
 103. Id. at 2, ¶ 3. 
 104. Tsunami Victims Group v. Accor N. Am. Inc., No. 05-CV-2599 (S.D.N.Y. filed 
March 4, 2005) [hereinafter the Complaint]. 
 105. The Complaint, ¶ 19–21. The Complaint also contends that although the NOAA 
registered the Indian Ocean earthquake, it failed to timely alert the affected countries of 
the impending tsunami. Id. ¶ 17. Further, the Complaint alleges that Accor knew or 
should have known that its resort in Khao Lak, Thailand was located in an area that was 
susceptible to earthquakes and tsunamis, and had a duty to notify its guests of impending 
dangers and take the proper and necessary precautions, such as evacuating the beach and 
moving people to higher ground. Id. ¶ 23. For the purposes of this Note, an analysis of 
the Complaint solely focuses on the alleged duty of the Kingdom of Thailand—to warn 
other countries of the approaching tsunami. This Note does not assess the sufficiency of 
the Plaintiffs’ other arguments in the Complaint. 
 106. The Complaint lists the following suggested notification devices: radio, televi-
sion, electronic notices, emergency broadcasts, and air raids. Id. ¶ 21. 
 107. See Evan R. Seamone, The Duty to “Expect the Unexpected”: Mitigating Extreme 
Natural Threats to the Global Commons Such as Asteroid and Comet Impacts with the 
Earth, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 758 (2003) (justifying the duty to warn of natu-
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tional community recognized the lack of disaster preparedness from not 
having a proper warning system in place, which resulted in the failure to 
mitigate harm to the people in disaster-stricken regions. In response to 
the tsunami disaster, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) launched the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS) 
program, an effort to develop “integrated early warning and mitigation 
systems” to assist the Indian Ocean region in detecting and preparing for 
natural disasters, such as tsunamis and other coastal hazards.108 The 
IOTWS program involves the participation of several U.S. agencies,109 
the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the U.N. Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, numerous donor nations,110 
and national governments located in the Indian Ocean region.111 The goal 
of the IOTWS is “to build up the human and institutional infrastructure 
to make sure these [warning] systems are interoperable and sustainable 
for years to come.”112
 
ral impacts with the duty of cooperative preservation, a framework that assigns State 
responsibility for natural harm by recognizing that “when facing threats of a great magni-
tude which endanger more than one nation, nations must cooperate in order to fulfill du-
ties to preserve their own citizens”); see also William C. Nicholson, Legal Issues: Warn-
ing Systems, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.riskinstitute.org/newsite/uploads/PERI_ 
Symposium_Nicholson.pdf (recognizing that predicting natural disasters like tsunamis is 
difficult, but possible). Nicholson writes: 
[Tsunamis] may occur in a particular geographic area at an indefinite upcoming 
time. Some coastal locations might not be affected by tsunamis for hundreds or 
thousands of years. Other localities, like the Indian Ocean, are the tsunami 
equivalent to San Francisco for earthquakes or Florida for hurricanes. [How-
ever, since] [a]ll of these acts of nature are reasonably foreseeable, . . . that fact 
establishes a duty to use reasonable care to decrease the risks of a catastrophe. 
Id. 
 108. Press Release, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. [USAID], USAID Announces Launch 
of Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System Program (Aug. 17, 2005) available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2005/pr050817.html [hereinafter USAID Press Re-
lease]. 
 109. The key U.S. agencies contributing to the IOTWS program include: USAID’s 
Regional Development Mission for Asia in Bangkok, NOAA, U.S. Geological Survey, 
U.S. Trade and Development Agency, USDA Forest Service, and the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center. Id. 
 110. While donor nations or donor governments repeatedly provide the majority of 
disaster relief assistance, their relief aid is often directed through the U.N. or private 
agencies. GREEN, supra note 20, at 29. 
 111. USAID Press Release, supra note 108. 
 112. Id. (explaining that a top priority in the post-tsunami reconstruction effort was to 
work with the participating entities to establish a fully functional warning system in the 
Indian Ocean). 
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Considering the international community’s response to the tragic tsu-
nami disaster—developing a tsunami warning system in the Indian 
Ocean—and the recognition of the duty to warn in prior international 
case law and past international man-made disasters, there is considerable 
evidence that the international community has acknowledged the duty to 
warn concept. Thus, in the context of natural disasters, it is conceivable 
that disaster-affected States and the international community of States 
have a duty to warn of impending or occurring natural disasters, which 
encompasses the responsibility to prevent, or mitigate, harm afflicted to 
disaster-affected people and countries.113
2. The Responsibility to React 
The second prong of the ICISS’ three-pronged responsibility is the re-
sponsibility to react, which denotes that “when a [S]tate is unable or un-
willing to redress the [adverse] situation, then interventionary measures 
by other members of the broader community of [S]tates may be re-
quired.”114 The duty to intervene has principally been discussed in the 
context of humanitarian intervention, during which States take armed 
intervening measures in another State, without its consent, to redress the 
treatment of its population who are being subject to gross violations of 
human rights.115 While there is currently debate over the controversial 
 
 113. Formulating an argument for imposing on all States a duty to warn of natural 
disasters logically begs the question of whether States should be held liable for their fail-
ure to warn. While this Note does not delve into the aspects of States’ liability for failure 
to adhere to their proposed responsibilities, it is arguably not in the best interest of the 
international community to hold States strictly liable because of the value of international 
diplomacy over adverse political implications arising from a finding of liability. Cf. 
McClatchey, supra note 64, at 676–78 (explaining that international law prefers to use a 
negligence standard for State responsibility for transboundary harm, rather than a strict 
liability standard. Under a traditional tort analysis of negligence for transboundary harm, 
the complaining State must prove that: (1) the offending conduct is attributable to the 
defendant State; (2) the offending State breached an international duty; (3) a causal con-
nection exists between the conduct and the injury; and (4) material damages took place.). 
Id. This Note does note inquire into the intricacies of States’ liability for failure to adhere 
to their responsibilities regarding natural disasters, but posits that implementing diplo-
matic measures and political incentives, which focus on shared interests and foster inter-
national cooperation among States, would more effectively influence the conduct of 
States in adhering to their responsibilities. Id. at 680. 
 114. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34, ¶ 4.1. 
 115. A.P.V. Rogers, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 27 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 725, 730 (2004) (noting that humanitarian intervention is generally thought 
of as the “use of force without the authorization of the Security Council to protect sec-
tions of a State’s population from gross and persistent human rights abuses”); Ravi Ma-
halingam, Comment, The Compatibility of the Principle of Nonintervention with the 
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doctrine of humanitarian intervention,116 this Note does not delve into 
the complexities of the humanitarian intervention dispute. Rather, this 
Note posits that the responsibility to react can conceivably apply to 
catastrophic natural disasters, during which there also exists grave human 
suffering. Such responsibility would be to unconditionally provide and 
accept needed humanitarian assistance when disaster-affected States are 
unwilling or unable to provide disaster relief. 
International case law has addressed the responsibility to provide and 
accept humanitarian assistance. The I.C.J. in Nicaragua v. U.S.117 articu-
lated this responsibility: 
There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid 
[such as food, clothing, and medicine] to persons or forces in another 
country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be re-
garded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to in-
ternational law.118
In its opinion, the I.C.J. justified neutral offers of humanitarian aid, 
which is offered in accordance with the purposes declared by the Red 
 
Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221, 258 
(1996); Ken Roth, War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention, Human Rights Watch 
World Report 2004 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm (stating 
that as a threshold issue, humanitarian intervention, without the target government’s con-
sent, can only be justified when there is evidence of imminent or existing genocide, or 
other similar mass slaughter or loss of human life); Arnison, supra note 29, at 200 (noting 
that the U.N. has recognized the need for humanitarian intervention when a vast amount 
of human lives are at risk, such as during situations of “armed conflict, massive human 
rights abuses, or starvation”). 
 116. Rogers, supra note 115, at 730–32 (explaining that the opinions of international 
lawyers regarding humanitarian intervention typically fall into six views: (1) humanitar-
ian intervention is unlawful; (2) humanitarian intervention is presently unlawful, but may 
become lawful in the future in distinctly defined circumstances, and argue for a princi-
pled code of law regarding humanitarian intervention; (3) lukewarm acceptance for hu-
manitarian intervention, especially when used to save a large number of lives; (4) justifi-
cation for humanitarian intervention when States collapse and there is a need for immedi-
ate and short-term emergency action to protect lives; (5) the right of humanitarian inter-
vention is emerging, yet still in its infancy; and (6) there is a legal right to humanitarian 
intervention as a matter of last resort only in extreme humanitarian emergencies that in-
volve large-scale loss of life). 
 117. In Nicaragua v. U.S., Nicaragua claimed that the United States supported a mer-
cenary army by financing and assisting the army’s movement to overthrow the Sandinista 
Government of Nicaragua, thus using armed force against Nicaragua. According to Nica-
ragua, the United States violated its obligations under international law, the U.N. Charter, 
the Organization of American States Charter, and the bilateral U.S.-Nicaragua Treaty of 
Friendship and Commerce. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 4, 18–22 (June 27). 
 118. Id. ¶ 242. 
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Cross: “to prevent and alleviate human suffering,” “to protect life and 
health,” “to ensure respect for the human being,” and to “be given with-
out discrimination to all in need.”119 Based on these stated objectives, it 
is reasonable to conclude that international law supports humanitarian 
assistance for natural disaster victims, provided that the relief offered is 
for purely humane purposes.120
Several past natural disasters, in particular North Korea’s famine and 
Hurricane Katrina, have highlighted the responsibility of disaster-
affected States to accept needed humanitarian assistance and the concur-
rent responsibility of the international community of States to uncondi-
tionally offer humanitarian aid. 
i. North Korea’s Famine 
In the 1990s under the Pyongyang regime,121 a famine in North Korea 
killed approximately one-million people, about five percent of its popula-
tion.122 This famine continues today as North Korea is now facing its 
second decade of food shortages.123 There exists disagreement over the 
causes of this famine.124 North Korea claims it arose primarily from 
natural disasters, such as the floods of 1995, which devastated its rice-
growing regions.125 Conversely, other views regard the floods as a sig-
nificant exacerbating factor that diverted blame away from the North 
Korean government, and ultimately speculate that the causes of the fam-
ine are political.126 Regardless of the cause, the effects of the famine are 
 
 119. Id. ¶¶ 242–43. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Jean-Hervé Bradol, Introduction: The Sacrificial International Order and Hu-
manitarian Action, in IN THE SHADOW OF ‘JUST WARS:’ VIOLENCE, POLITICS AND 
HUMANITARIAN ACTION 1, 17–18 (Fabrice Weissman ed., 2004) (noting that the Pyongy-
ang Regime was profiting from one of the largest food aid operations carried out by the 
U.N. World Food Program (WFP)). 
 122. Stephan Haggard & Marcus Noland, Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of 
Famine in North Korea, at 8 (2005), available at http://www.hrnk.org/hunger/hungerRep 
ort05.pdf. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 11. 
 125. Id.; Fiona Terry, North Korea: Feeding Totalitarianism, in IN THE SHADOW OF 
‘JUST WARS:’ VIOLENCE, POLITICS AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra note 121, at 88, 90 
(noting that heavy flooding in the mid-1990s exacerbated an already distressed agricul-
tural sector). 
 126. Critics argue that North Korea’s pursuit of food security through its strategy of 
self-sufficiency—meeting food demands entirely with domestic production—led to the 
recurrent food shortages because of the high ratio of the population to arable land. Hag-
gard & Noland, supra note 122, at 12–13; Terry, supra note 125, at 90 (noting that in the 
case of North Korea, there are several possible origins of the famine crisis. However, 
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devastating as close to two-million people have died and children con-
tinue to suffer from chronic malnutrition.127 These figures show that 
North Korea was not only slow to recognize the extent of its famine 
problem, but also slow to provide adequate relief for its famine-stricken 
population.128
North Korea’s inadequate response became evident at the height of the 
famine in the mid-1990s when it allowed humanitarian assistance from 
the international community of States, but kept tight restrictions over the 
entry of relief goods into many areas of the country.129 North Korea also 
refused “to allow swift and equitable distribution” of the aid to its peo-
ple.130 Furthermore, North Korea’s recent request to end all humanitarian 
relief has received much criticism.131 Deputy Foreign Minister Choe Su-
hon asserted that because of North Korea’s good harvest, North Korea 
has enough food and no longer needs food aid.132 However, putting a 
stop to relief efforts such as the U.N. World Food Program (“WFP”),133 
 
because of its isolation, the particular cause of its famine are unknown.). This Note nei-
ther probes into an analysis of opposing views regarding North Korea’s famine crisis, nor 
seeks to determine which view was correct, be it floods or political agenda. Rather, this 
Note focuses on North Korea’s inadequate response to its famine crisis. Terry, supra note 
125, at 90. 
 127. May Lee, Famine May Have Killed 2 Million in North Korea, CNN.COM, Aug. 
19, 1998, available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9808/19/nkorea.famine; 
Press Release, Amnesty International, North Korea: Denial of Right to Food, Jan. 20, 
2004, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGASA240042004. 
 128. Haggard & Noland, supra note 122, at 20 (noting that the Public Distribution 
System—the rationing system implemented to ensure food security—was unable to pro-
vide even the minimal amount of food needed for human survival during the mid-1990s). 
 129. North Korea Rejects UN Food Aid, BBC NEWS, Sept. 23, 2005, 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4273844.stm. 
 130. Press Release, Amnesty International, supra note 127. 
 131. See N. Korea Says Asked UN to End All Humanitarian Aid, REUTERS ALERTNET, 
Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N22591326.htm; Paul Eckert, 
North Korea Plan to Halt Aid a Bad Idea, REDORBIT, Sept. 27, 2005, 
http://www.rednova.com/news/international/252321/nkorea_plan_to_halt_aid_a_bad_ide
a_us_agency/index.html (quoting Andrew Natsios, head of USAID, “[North Korea is] 
going to shut down the World Food Program efforts at the end of this year, which we 
think is a mistake, . . . humanitarian needs in North Korea remain significant”). 
 132. N. Korea Says Asked UN to End All Humanitarian Aid, supra note 131 (quoting 
Deputy Foreign Minister Choe Su-Hon, “[h]umanitarian assistance cannot last too long 
. . . [w]e have very good farming this year. Our government is prepared to provide the 
food to all our people.”). 
 133. The U.N. established the WFP in 1961. Its purpose is to provide food on an emer-
gency basis to disaster-stricken and famine-affected regions. The WFP also provides 
technical support to developing countries to help improve their food production, storage, 
and distribution systems. GORMAN, supra note 10, at 83–84. 
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an international food aid agency that has nourished approximately 6.5 
million North Koreans, raises concerns about North Korea’s ability to 
provide adequate relief to its famine-stricken population.134
Governments of disaster-affected States have rejected relief offers in 
the past. During the 1976 Guatemalan earthquake and the 1976 Philip-
pine earthquake and tidal wave,135 humanitarian aid to both disaster-
affected States appeared to “have strings attached.”136 Likewise, Mr. 
Choe Su-hon asserted that food aid to North Korea also had strings at-
tached and argued that the international community of States, particularly 
the United States, “politicize[d] humanitarian assistance, [by] linking it 
to the human rights issue.”137 The U.S. State Department has adamantly 
rejected North Korea’s accusations, arguing that the United States’ deci-
sions to provide humanitarian assistance were not based on political 
agenda, but rather on need: the need of the country involved, competing 
needs elsewhere, and ensuring that the provision of aid goes to the needi-
est.138 This need-based rationale provides a sensible approach for all 
 
 134. See sources cited infra note 140. 
 135. Freudenheim, supra note 82, at 242 (explaining that in the aftermath of the 1976 
Guatemalan earthquake, the Guatemalan government rejected a British offer of aid, not 
because the aid was unnecessary, but rather because of a “political dispute between the 
two countries over the neighboring country of Belize.” Freudenheim notes that Guate-
mala’s acceptance of the British aid “would have been politically embarrassing.” Addi-
tionally, in the aftermath of the Philippine earthquake and tidal wave in 1976, President 
Ferdinand Marcos refused American aid because the Philippine government viewed the 
aid as “aid for concessions in their treaty negotiations.” Freudenheim notes that while the 
Philippine government declared that no foreign aid was necessary in its relief operation, it 
consequently stated that UNICEF aid and aid from other U.N. agencies did not classify as 
foreign aid.). Id. 
 136. Id. Freudenheim further notes the concern that political considerations of national 
governments, donor governments, and international agencies may influence the provision 
of disaster relief, stating, “[t]he effects of this political reality, which can be as disastrous 
to the victim as any earthquake, drought, or epidemic, should be of urgent concern to all 
those interested in improving the international and national response to natural disaster 
situations.” Id. at 244. 
 137. See N. Korea Says Asked UN to End All Humanitarian Aid, supra note 131. 
 138. Id. In the World Disasters Report of 2000, the IFRCRCS quoted Margareta Wahl-
ström, the Under-Secretary General for Disaster Response and Operational Coordination, 
on the effects of continuing aid to North Korea in the wake of political upheaval. Wahl-
ström states: 
The [aid] system might be utilized but . . . it is for a good purpose because you 
cannot create stability in this part of the world without creating a bridge. The 
humanitarian agencies, be it the UN, the Red Cross or NGOs . . . have made an 
incredible contribution to creating that bridge unconditional[ly]. The conditions 
we have imposed . . . belong to the humanitarian agenda . . . . [W]e have not 
said that in order to give food we need something else from you. 
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States to follow regarding the provision and acceptance of international 
disaster relief aid.139 Therefore, North Korea’s justification for rejecting 
humanitarian assistance should depend on whether its harvest meets the 
needs of its people. 
North Korea’s harvest has eased the food shortage. However, the inter-
national community still believes that North Korea needs humanitarian 
assistance, particularly to provide food for those most in need: children, 
pregnant women, urban poor, and elderly.140 Current conditions in North 
Korea also show that its obstruction of needed humanitarian aid is hurt-
ing, rather than benefiting its population.141 Therefore, because of North 
Korea’s unwillingness to protect the well-being of its people, the interna-
tional community of States has a responsibility to provide unconditional 
humanitarian assistance to protect the people of North Korea. Accord-
ingly, North Korea should have a responsibility to accept the needed hu-
manitarian relief. 
ii. Hurricane Katrina 
From August 25 to August 31, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, varying in 
strength from a category one to category five hurricane,142 swept across 
the southern United States striking Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama.143 Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff described 
 
Terry, supra note 124, at 101. 
 139. See N. Korea Says Asked UN to End All Humanitarian Aid, supra note 131. 
 140. Id.; see also North Korea Rejects UN Food Aid, BBC NEWS, Sept. 9, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4273844.stm (citing Undersecre-
tary-General Jan Egeland’s, the U.N. humanitarian affairs coordinator, statement that “an 
‘abrupt’ end to food aid would harm North Korea’s most vulnerable.” Also, Gerald 
Bourke, a spokesman for the WFP, stated that, “North Korea has a substantial and 
chronic food deficit, [and] malnutrition rates, especially for mothers and young children, 
were still very high.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. For an explanation of the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, see NOAA, The Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane Scale, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml (last visited Nov. 
12, 2005). 
The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1–5 rating based on the hurricane’s 
present intensity. This is used to give an estimate of the potential property dam-
age and flooding expected along the coast from a hurricane landfall. Wind 
speed is the determining factor in the scale, as storm surge values are highly 
dependent on the slope of the continental shelf and the shape of the coastline, in 
the landfall region. 
Id. 
 143. The Brookings Institution, Hurricane Katrina Timeline, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/homeland/katrinatimeline.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 
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the hurricane as an “ultra-catastrophe,” ravaging through four states, 
triggering a flood due to failed canal levees that swamped New Or-
leans,144 the nation’s thirty-fifth largest city, and resulting in a break-
down of civil order.145 As of September 15, 2005, Hurricane Katrina had 
caused “$125 billion dollars in damage/costs, making [it] the most ex-
pensive natural disaster in U.S. history.”146 Additionally, Hurricane 
Katrina devastated the lives of thousands of people.147 Ordinary citizens 
and other countries criticized the United States’ response to this hurri-
cane148 as a disaster in itself because of the lack of preparedness and the 
many days it took for relief aid and personnel to reach New Orleans and 
other hurricane-devastated areas.149 President George W. Bush acknowl-
edged the United States’ inadequate response to the hurricane saying, 
“Katrina exposed serious problems in our response capability at all levels 
of government and to the extent the federal government didn’t fully do 
its job right, I take full responsibility.”150
A congressional investigation revealed that the U.S. government at all 
levels failed to adequately prepare for and respond to this tragedy.151 For 
 
2005). How the Hurricane Crisis Unfolded, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ 
hi/world/americas/4211404.stm (last visited Nov. 12, 2005). 
 144. It is also possible to view the breached canal levees, which flooded about eighty 
percent of New Orleans, as a failure of the responsibility to prevent, or mitigate, harm 
resulting from Hurricane Katrina. Investigation is pending regarding whether the failure 
of the levees was due to poor engineering, faulty construction, or lack of proper mainte-
nance. Kevin Krolicki, Louisiana Mulls Legal Action on Failed Levees, Reuters AlertNet, 
Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N08646512.htm. 
 145. Spencer S. Hsu & Steve Hendrix, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Were Like Night 
and Day, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2005, at A01. 
 146. National Climatic Data Center, Billion Dollar U.S. Weather Disasters, 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Juan Forero & Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Allies, and Others, Send Offers of Assis-
tance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005 (noting that the circulation of televised and printed im-
ages of destruction, suffering, and death from Hurricane Katrina provoked disbelief and 
an outpouring of sympathy and assistance from the international community); World 
Shocked by U.S. Response to Storm, GAINESVILLE.COM, Sept. 4, 2005, 
http://www.gainesville.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20040904/WIRE/50904039/1117
/news (noting the world’s shock and criticism over such a wealthy and powerful coun-
try’s response to the storm). 
 149. John King & Suzanne Malveaux, Bush: ‘I take responsibility’ for Federal Fail-
ures After Katrina, CNN.COM, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/ 
13/katrina.washington/index.html. 
 150. Id. 
 151. H.R. REP. NO. 109-377, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT 
BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO 
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example, in the aftermath of the hurricane’s destruction, it took several 
days to get help to the thousands of people left behind without food and 
water. Those who sought safety in shelters such as the Superdome sta-
dium were subject to grossly degenerate conditions.152 Moreover, as ae-
rial shots of New Orleans showed, hundreds of school and city buses 
were flooded with water—buses that could have been used in the evacua-
tion process.153 The rest of the United States and the world watched these 
horrific images on television, questioning why the United States was un-
able to respond effectively to the disastrous effects, as well as criticizing 
the United States for its lack of any competently executed evacuation 
plan, organized relief effort, or central command to coordinate relief.154
Despite criticism regarding the United States’ inability to effectively 
provide relief to its disaster-stricken regions, other countries expressed 
their sympathy and generosity towards disaster victims, as offers of over 
$1 billion in cash and supplies poured in from nearly ninty-five na-
tions,155 which included several countries that are adversaries or typically 
aid recipients, not aid donors.156 The United States graciously accepted 
 
HURRICANE KATRINA, at 1–5 (2005), available at http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_ 
report.htm. 
 152. Evan Thomas, The Lost City: What Went Wrong: Devastating a Swath of the 
South, Katrina Plunged New Orleans into Agony. The Story of a Story—and a Disas-
trously Slow Rescue, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9179587/site/newsweek/?g=1 (describing the nightmarish 
conditions at the Superdome: the air conditioning failed; the lights went out, leaving the 
stadium only dimly lit; the hurricane broke holes through the roof; the availability of 
bottled water was scarce; the stench of unwashed bodies and overflowed toilets; the occa-
sional sounds of gunshots; and the occurrences of rapes). 
 153. Tom Foreman, Mike M. Ahlers, & Anderson Cooper, ‘People Making Decisions 
Hesitated:’ More Officials’ Jobs May Fall to Katrina Response Criticism, CNN.COM, 
Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/13/katrina.response/index.html. 
 154. Thomas, supra note 152. 
 155. U.S. Receives Aid Offers from Around the World, CNN.COM, Sept. 4, 2005, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/US/09/04/katrina.world.aid/; Offers of Aid from Around the 
World, CNN.COM, Sept, 5, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/05/katrina.world.aid 
(highlighting examples of documented foreign aid, which include: Nigeria’s pledge of $1 
million; Japan’s offer of $200,000 to the American Red Cross and $300,000 in emer-
gency supplies; India’s $5 million donation to the American Red Cross and willingness to 
donate medicine; Afghanistan’s offer of $100,000; Sri Lanka’s donation of $25,000 to the 
American Red Cross; Mexico’s offer of $1 million and delivery of fifteen truckloads of 
water, food, and medical supplies; Israel’s offer to provide medical assistance in the form 
of personnel, equipment, and medicines; and Qatar’s offer of $100 million). 
 156. Barbara Slavin, Some Foreign Attempt to Send U.S. Aid Stymied, 
USATODAY.COM, Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-09-07-
katrina-world_x.htm?POE=click-refer (noting that Mexico’s offer to deliver relief sup-
plies and medical personnel to Texas, via a Mexican army convoy and navy ship, would 
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much of the disaster relief aid, provided that it was matched with need 
and offered in the spirit of humanitarian assistance,157 and was thankful 
for the generosity expressed by the international community.158 Although 
the United States accepted most of the offered relief, there were com-
plaints from the international community of States concerning the “bu-
reaucratic entanglements” that hindered the shipment of relief supplies to 
the United States.159 However, it is reasonable to perceive that such de-
lay was due to temporary technical and logistical problems,160 as well as 
the novelty of coordinating the acceptance of such a considerable amount 
of international aid to the United States.161 Similar to North Korea’s re-
sponse to its famine, international criticism also arose from the United 
States’ rejection of aid from certain countries.162 This rejection has been 
 
be the first time Mexican soldiers entered the United States unarmed since 1846); A For-
eign Aid Twist: U.S. Gets, Others Give, USATODAY.COM, Sept. 6, 2005, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-09-06-US-aid_x.htm (noting 
Cuba’s offer to send medical personnel and tsunami-devastated Sri Lanka’s $25,000 do-
nation to the American Red Cross). 
 157. Slavin, supra note 156 (quoting U.S. State Department official Harry Thomas, 
who was in charge of coordinating foreign aid offers, “[t]he worst thing we could do is to 
take things, have them . . . sit on the ground and not be utilized, to have something rot or 
not get to people quickly”). 
 158. A Foreign Aid Twist: U.S. Gets, Others Give, supra note 156 (noting Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice’s efforts in profusely thanking other countries for the humanitar-
ian assistance offered to the United States); César G. Soriano, Foreign Aid Flows in for 
Katrina Victims, USATODAY.COM, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world 
/2005-09-05-aid-katrina_x.htm (quoting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s deep 
appreciation for the foreign offers, “[p]eople have said that America has been so generous 
. . . in other places, and now it is time to be generous to America”); Forero & Weisman, 
supra note 148 (quoting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “[r]ecently we have seen 
the American people respond generously to help others around the globe during their 
times of distress, such as during the recent tsunami . . . [t]oday we are seeing a similar 
urgent, warm and compassionate reaction”). 
 159. German Plane with Katrina Food Aid Turned Away, USATODAY.COM, Sept. 10, 
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-10-german-aid_x.htm. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Forero & Weisman, supra note 148 (noting that the United States seemed initially 
unprepared for the outpouring of aid, which surpassed the humanitarian aid offered after 
the 9/11 attacks); Slavin, supra note 156 (quoting Natalie Loiseau, press counselor at the 
French Embassy in Washington, D.C., “this is the first time the United States has [had] to 
welcome foreign aid, so no one has had this job (of facilitating foreign aid)”). 
 162. Mary Murray, Katrina Aid from Cuba? No Thanks, Says U.S., MSNBC.COM, 
Sept. 14, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9311876 (explaining that the United States as-
serted it would not need Cuba’s medical brigade because of a “robust response from the 
American medical community”); Wolfson, supra note 13 (noting that the United States 
rejected Iran’s offer of ten million barrels of crude oil because it was conditioned on lift-
ing economic sanctions). 
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justified because certain offers were either not needed or conditional, not 
solely for the protection of disaster victims.163
Nevertheless, the outpouring of hurricane relief to the United States 
further supports the responsibility of the international community of 
States and disaster-affected States regarding humanitarian assistance. 
Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that when disaster-affected States, re-
gardless of their wealth and power, are unable to effectively provide ade-
quate relief to its disaster-stricken populations, the international commu-
nity of States has a responsibility to unconditionally offer aid and disas-
ter-affected States have a responsibility to accept it, provided that the aid 
is needed and in the spirit of humanitarian assistance. 
3. The Responsibility to Rebuild 
The third prong of the ICISS’ three-pronged responsibility is the re-
sponsibility to rebuild, which implies that: 
[B]ecause of a breakdown or abdication of a [S]tate’s own capacity and 
authority in discharging its ‘responsibility to protect’—there should be 
a genuine commitment to helping to build a durable peace, and promot-
ing good governance and sustainable development.164
In the context of natural disasters, the responsibility to rebuild refers to 
the responsibility of disaster-affected States and the international com-
munity of States to cooperatively work towards “[e]nsuring [the] sustain-
able reconstruction and rehabilitation”165 of communities that have suf-
fered extensive destruction caused by natural disasters. The responsibil-
ity to rebuild coincides with the U.N. Declaration on the Right to Devel-
opment (“Right to Development”): 
[A]n inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person 
and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.166
The Right to Development imposes on all Member States the duty to 
improve the well-being of their populations, by ensuring “access to basic 
resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment, and 
the fair distribution of income.”167 The right to development, as it per-
 
 163. Id. 
 164. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 34, ¶ 5.1. 
 165. Id. ¶ 5.2. 
 166. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 1, ¶ 1, U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
 167. Id. art 2, ¶ 3; art. 8, ¶ 1. 
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tains to natural disasters, is the responsibility of all States to rebuild dis-
aster-stricken communities by assisting in the post-disaster reconstruc-
tion phase and providing essential resources for disaster victims. The 
earthquake in Pakistan is an example of a natural disaster where all 
States recognized their responsibility to rebuild.168
i. Pakistan’s Earthquake 
On the morning of October 8, 2005, a devastating earthquake, measur-
ing 7.6 on the Richter scale,169 struck Northern Pakistan, triggering land-
slides and hundreds of continuous aftershocks.170 As of November 20, 
2005, the earthquake had killed approximately 86,000 people, including 
more than 17,000 children, most of whom died as a result of being 
crushed by collapsing concrete roofs of poorly constructed schools;171 
injured over 100,000 people; and caused destruction to infrastructure and 
housing, leaving an estimated 500,000 families homeless.172 Immediately 
after the earthquake, the Pakistani army and aid workers struggled to 
overcome logistical challenges that led to difficulties providing relief for 
disaster victims.173 During the weeks following the earthquake, condi-
tions in Pakistan worsened as the estimated death toll increased and the 
provided aid to victims remained grossly insufficient.174
 
 168. Although not discussed more fully in this Note, another example of the failure to 
adhere to the responsibility to rebuild was apparent with the intense criticism that arose 
over the reconstruction efforts after Hurricane Katrina. While President Bush pledged the 
federal government’s commitment to “stay as long as it takes to help citizens rebuild their 
communities and their lives,” many state and local officials cited several stalled bills and 
policy changes, including measures to finance hurricane protection, revive small busi-
nesses, and compensate uninsured victims, all of which were vital to rebuilding New 
Orleans and encouraging evacuees to return to the city. James Dao, Louisiana Sees Faded 
Urgency in Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005. 
 169. Pakistan EarthQuake, Pakistan Earthquake 2005: Recent Earthquake Disaster in 
Pakistan, http://www.earthquake.com.pk/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). 
 170. Somini Sengupta & David Rohde, Pledges Exceed Goal for Pakistan Quake Aid, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/20/international/asia/20qua 
ke.html. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], Pakistan Earth-
quake, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/earthquake?page=intro (last visited Nov. 
20, 2005). 
 174. Id. (noting that the estimated death toll climbed from 10,000-15,000 people on the 
first day to more than 50,000 people two weeks later. Additionally, funds from the inter-
national community, both governments and private organizations, were extremely slow to 
materialize.). Comparing the relief efforts in Pakistan with that of the Indian Ocean tsu-
nami demonstrate the grossly inadequate international responses to catastrophic natural 
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In its relief efforts, Pakistan focused on two goals: (1) to provide ade-
quate shelter to the 200,000 people in the high altitude villages, which 
would be cut off by snow; and (2) to improve the sanitation system of 
hundreds of refugee camps.175 The U.N. reaffirmed these goals in its re-
lief operation’s reconstruction efforts, which involved providing ade-
quate shelter, particularly for those communities in high altitudes, and 
rebuilding houses to withstand future natural disasters.176 However, in-
sufficient funding significantly hindered the U.N. relief effort.177 Be-
cause the funding needed to rebuild the earthquake-devastated areas of 
Pakistan did not reach the requested level, U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan called upon the entire international community, including gov-
ernments, the private sector, and individuals, for the relief supplies, re-
sources, and funding needed to adequately rebuild Pakistan’s communi-
ties.178
Along with the U.N. relief effort, the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), an organization whose mandate is to assist refugees 
fleeing war and persecution and is not normally involved in natural dis-
aster relief efforts, was entrusted to manage over 500 camps consisting of 
nearly 187,000 people.179 Moreover, the United States, through USAID 
and the U.S. military, remained committed to providing humanitarian 
 
disasters. Quake ‘Is UN’s Worst Nightmare,’ BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2005, 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4358902.stm (highlighting 
that while ninety-two countries provided humanitarian assistance for the Indian Ocean 
tsunami, only fifteen to twenty countries have responded to the earthquake in Pakistan). 
 175. Sengupta & Rohde, supra note 170. 
 176. Urging Greater Generosity, Annan Arrives in Pakistan for Quake Donor Confer-
ence, UN NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?/NewsID=16592&CR= 
Pakistan&CR1=quake# note (last visited Nov. 20. 2005). 
 177. Id. (quoting U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s plea for help, “[w]e need more 
resources, not just for emergency relief, but also for recovery and reconstruction . . . . We 
are going to do what we tend to call ‘recovery plus.’ Not just build what was there before, 
but build in a manner that can withstand . . . if another disaster struck.” Further noting 
that in its latest update, the “UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) reported that the UN’s $550 million flash appeal was still less than thirty per-
cent funded, with only five percent of shelter needs and nine percent of water and sanita-
tion requirements so far met.”); Sengupta & Rohde, supra note 170 (noting that dangers 
persisted as the U.N. relief operation remained grossly underfinanced). 
 178. Urging Greater Generosity, Annan Arrives in Pakistan for Quake Donor Confer-
ence, supra note 176 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “I would expect the 
world, those with capacity, to be generous and to give, and give willingly and I am not 
just speaking to governments, I am also speaking to the private sector and individuals 
who have been generous in other situations. I call on all of them to help us here as well”). 
 179. UNHCR, UNHCR Reinforces Cold-Weather Supplies in Earthquake Survivor 
Camps, UNHCR NEWS STORIES, Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&id=4399a2054. 
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assistance to the earthquake-devastated region during both the immediate 
emergency response phase and long-term reconstruction phase.180 In a 
joint news conference with Pakistani Foreign Minister Mian Khurshid 
Mahmood Kasuri, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated: 
[T]he United States will want to support[,] along with the international 
community[,] the people of Pakistan as they try to rebuild . . . . [S]o as 
we think about the immediate needs we will also start with the Paki-
stani Government to look to the future . . . . [O]ur thoughts are with you 
[the people of Pakistan] . . . in your hour of need . . . . [W]e will be with 
you not just today, but also tomorrow as you try to rebuild.181
The combined actions of Pakistan and the international community of 
States, through their support of the relief efforts of organizations such as 
the U.N. and the UNHCR, demonstrate the responsibility of disaster-
affected States and the international community of States to work to-
gether, beyond the immediate relief phase, to rebuild disaster-devastated 
regions. 
B. Problem: Authority for the Responsibility to Protect in Natural Disas-
ters 
These past natural disasters have demonstrated a regard among all 
States for the responsibility to prevent harm to disaster-affected popula-
tions, to react to the devastation, and to rebuild destroyed communi-
ties.182 However, the issue remains of finding the basis for this collection 
of responsibilities under international law. The responsibility to protect is 
justified as arising from legal obligations, primarily imposed by interna-
tional treaties and customary international law.183 Since there are no in-
 
 180. USAID, US Continues Massive Humanitarian Response to Pakistan Earthquake, 
available at http://www.usaid.gov/pl/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2005) (noting that USAID has 
organized nine airlifts of emergency relief supplies consisting of 45,000 blankets, 1,570 
winterized tents, plastic sheeting, water purification units, emergency kits, and over 4,800 
metric tons of food. The U.S. military has delivered over 2,400 metric tons of relief sup-
plies and evacuated 10,000 casualties.). 
 181. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, U.S. to Provide Additional Help to Pakistan Earthquake 
Victims, USINFO, Oct. 12, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2005/Oct/12-
964090.html. 
 182. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 183. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999) (recognizing two main forms of international law: 
treaty and custom); Coursen-Neff, supra note 86, at 693–702 (explaining in depth the two 
requirements for creating an obligation on States under customary international law: the 
opinio juris requirement—States’ acceptance that a certain rule is obligatory, and the 
State practice requirement—the general practice of States reflecting that the rule is 
obligatory); MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that under the principles of 
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ternational legal instruments that set forth the obligations of all States 
regarding natural disasters,184 it is logical to justify the responsibility to 
protect under customary international law. 
Under customary international law, there must be general agreement 
among all States to be bound to the responsibility to protect and exten-
sive and uniform State practice of this responsibility.185 While the inter-
national community of States and disaster-affected States, especially dur-
ing the Indian Ocean tsunami, North Korea’s famine, Hurricane Katrina, 
and Pakistan’s earthquake, have demonstrated an interest to be bound to 
the responsibility to protect,186 this interest may not rise to the level of a 
legal duty187 since State practice of the responsibility to protect victims 
of natural disasters is likely insufficient under customary international 
law standards.188 Thus, justifying the responsibility to protect under cus-
tomary international law may encounter difficulty meeting the State 
practice requirement. 
IV. TOWARDS RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF DISASTER VICTIMS 
Within the international community, it has been widely recognized that 
in the event of a natural disaster, “States have the primary responsibility 
to protect the people and property on their territory.”189 When a disaster 
 
international law, international instruments (rules, conventions, declarations, and resolu-
tions), State practice, and international organizations, all of which address disaster relief 
actions, are relevant to determining “the potential extent of the role of law within global 
relief policy”). 
 184. See supra text accompanying note 90; Coursen-Neff, supra note 86, at 704 (not-
ing that “[i]nternational law has progressed to the point where there is recognition of 
responsibility to disaster victims, but this recognition has not yet become legally bind-
ing”). 
 185. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43, 
¶¶ 74, 77 (Feb. 20) (stating that the “[t]he frequency, or even habitual character of [State] 
acts is not in itself enough [to constitute State practice under customary international 
law],” but that there must also be a sense of legal duty for the acts). 
 186. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 188. See Coursen-Neff, supra note 86, at 697 (noting that current “State practice thus 
lags behind the developing principle of responsibility to disaster victims”). 
 189. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION [ISDR], Hyogo Declaration, World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction (Jan. 18–22, 2005), at 2, ¶ 4, available 
at http://www.unisdr.org/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/L-docs/Hyogo-declaration-english. 
pdf. The goal of the ISDR is to build disaster-resilient communities through increasing 
public awareness of disaster risk and vulnerability, implementing disaster reduction poli-
cies and actions through the commitment of public officials, fostering the creation of 
partnerships among entities to expand risk reduction networks, and improving scientific 
knowledge about disaster reduction. ISDR: Mission and Objectives, 
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initially strikes, the first seventy-two hours are the most critical.190 Dur-
ing this initial relief phase, the responsibility of disaster-affected States is 
triggered, as the local and national response—in the form of civilian vol-
unteers, local governments, and non-governmental organizations—
provide the most immediately available relief to disaster victims.191 
However, when disaster-affected States are unable or unwilling to pro-
vide relief to victims of natural disasters, help from the international 
community of States is required.192 Typically, the international commu-
nity of States responds by unconditionally providing the humanitarian 
relief needed to protect the livelihoods of disaster victims.193 This emerg-
ing global recognition of the responsibility of all States to provide pro-
tection to natural disaster victims implies that these victims have certain 
rights deserving of protection. 
Since it may be problematic to find sufficient State practice of the re-
sponsibility to protect natural disaster victims under customary interna-
tional law standards,194 recognizing and codifying the rights of disaster 
victims within international human rights law would impose on all States 
a legal duty to protect these victims, thus justifying the responsibility to 
protect. 
A. The Relationship Between Human Rights and Natural Disaster Vic-
tims 
Acknowledging the applicability of human rights to natural disaster 
victims would expand the scope of international human rights and rein-
force the regime of international human rights law.195 If natural disaster 
 
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/isdr-mission-objectives-eng.htm (last visited Nov. 
25, 2005). The World Conference on Disaster Reduction recognized the achievements of 
disaster risk reduction practices, assessed the remaining challenges and emerging issues 
relating to risk reduction, and developed disaster risk reduction objectives. World Con-
ference on Disaster Reduction, http://www.unisdr.org/wcdr/preparatory-process/why-
wcdr.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2005). 
 190. Report on Wilton Park Conference, The Immediate Response to Disasters: Im-
proving National Aid and International Frameworks (Sept. 13–16, 2004), available at 
http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/web/papers/pdfs/pdfreports/WP757/WP757.pdf (noting 
that “[ninety-eight percent] of victims saved alive after an earthquake are rescued by 
family members or local responders”). 
 191. See id. 
 192. See, e.g., supra Part III.A.2. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Coursen-Neff, supra note 86, at 704 (noting that political factors, which en-
velop almost every natural disaster relief operation, may permanently obstruct State prac-
tice of international disaster relief from emerging into customary law). 
 195. Samuels, supra note 23, at 250. Arguments for applying human rights law to the 
area of refugees have also been made. Acknowledging the rights of refugees as human 
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victims possess rights to protection and all States recognize their legal 
obligation to protect those rights, then the international response to natu-
ral disasters would improve because all States would possess a sense of 
legal duty to protect the rights of disaster victims regardless of their po-
litical concerns.196 Recognizing and codifying the relationship between 
human rights and disaster victims would impose on all States a legal re-
sponsibility to protect natural disaster victims by: (1) preventing and 
mitigating adverse effects from disasters; (2) reacting to the needs of dis-
aster victims by unconditionally providing and accepting needed humani-
tarian assistance; and (3) rebuilding disaster-stricken communities.197
B. Legal Codification of the Rights of Natural Disaster Victims 
In a General Assembly Resolution entitled Setting International Stan-
dards in the Field of Human Rights (General Assembly Resolution 
41/120), the General Assembly reaffirmed the primary importance of the 
UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR to the framework of international 
human rights.198 The General Assembly recognized the value of further 
 
rights would recognize a legal right to asylum, thus strengthening the existing fundamen-
tal right to life and liberty and expanding the recognition of the UDHR, the ICCSR, and 
the ICESCR as applicable to all human beings, including refugees. Henkin, supra note 
71, at 119. Since applying international human rights law to refugees would strengthen 
and expand the existing fundamental human rights framework, it logically follows that 
applying international human rights to natural disaster victims would have the same ef-
fect on the international human rights regime. 
 196. See generally Forsythe, supra note 22, at 276–79 (recognizing the political obsta-
cles of international disaster relief and proposing four models of diplomatic approaches to 
cope with these political problems: (1) model one embraces the principle of State sover-
eignty and focuses on solving disaster relief problems by “improving traditional diplo-
macy between nations;” (2) model two is a “laissez-faire vision of international disaster 
relief that curtails government involvement in society;” (3) model three is a “transna-
tional vision of international disaster relief” that allows intergovernmental and nongov-
ernmental organizations to “act for individuals rather than as instruments of govern-
ments;” and (4) model four envisions the drafting of a multilateral “treaty, or legal, con-
ception of international disaster relief” that regulates relief). Under this categorical dis-
tinction, the proposed solution in this Note advocates for a combination of certain aspects 
of models one and four—reinforcing State sovereignty as the responsibility to protect the 
rights of natural disaster victims and codifying this principle under international law. 
 197. See Coursen-Neff, supra note 86, at 701–02 (explaining that the relationship be-
tween human rights and disaster victims would impose three legal obligations on States: 
(1) “the obligation to assist another in time[s] of natural disaster;” (2) “the obligation to 
prepare for disaster relief within [their] own territory and to take preventative measures in 
order to minimize the suffering resulting from natural disasters;” and (3) “the obligation 
to accept relief for [their] people from other [S]tates after the occurrence of a natural 
disaster, if [their] own resources are inadequate”). 
 198. G.A. Res. 41/120, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/120 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
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developing the regime of international human rights law by discovering 
specific areas that call for international action with respect to human 
rights.199 Article 4 of General Assembly Resolution 41/120 sets forth 
guidelines for Member States and the U.N. bodies to follow when pro-
posing new human rights instruments.200 Under Article 4, to establish a 
human rights instrument for natural disaster victims, the instrument must 
meet the following requirements: 
1. [b]e consistent with the existing body of international human rights 
law; 
2. [b]e of fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity 
and worth of the human person; 
3. [b]e sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practicable 
rights and obligations; 
4. [p]rovide, where appropriate, realistic and effective implementa-
tion machinery, including reporting systems; [and] 
5. [a]ttract broad international support.201 
The first requirement for establishing a human rights instrument for 
natural disaster victims is that the proposed rights of disaster victims be 
consistent with the current international human rights framework.202 In 
meeting the first requirement, the UDHR supports principles that are 
relevant to humanitarian assistance, that: (1) all States should prepare for 
disasters by taking preventative and precautionary measures to minimize 
suffering and destruction; (2) disaster-affected States should accept 
needed and neutral relief aid from the international community of States 
if their resources are inadequate; and (3) the international community of 
States and disaster-affected States should assist each other during emer-
gencies.203 More specifically, Article 25 of the UDHR provides that: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widow-
hood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control.204
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. ¶ 4. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. ¶ 4(a). 
 203. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 64. 
 204. UDHR art. 25(1). 
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In the event of natural disasters, the UDHR recognizes that all States 
have a responsibility to protect the victims to ensure their right to hu-
manitarian relief to improve the standard of living. 
Along with the UDHR, Article 11 of the ICESCR also encourages the 
cooperation of all States to promote and ensure the right to humanitarian 
assistance, stating: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of every-
one to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, includ-
ing adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous im-
provement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the 
essential importance of international co-operation based on free con-
sent.205
It is logical to interpret “continuous improvement of living conditions” 
and “international cooperation” to mean that all States have a responsi-
bility to work together towards improving the well-being of natural dis-
aster victims. Specifically, this continuous cooperation among disaster-
affected States and the international community of States should encom-
pass the continuum of responsibilities outlined in the responsibility to 
protect.206 While neither the UDHR nor the ICESCR explicitly mention 
natural disasters, these covenants are nevertheless applicable to disaster 
victims because the devastating effects of natural disasters significantly 
affect the protection of the rights enshrined in these covenants.207 There-
fore, the right of natural disaster victims to receive protection is consis-
tent with the International Bill of Human Rights, thus satisfying the first 
requirement for establishing a human rights instrument. 
The second requirement is that an international human rights instru-
ment pertaining to natural disaster victims “derives from the inherent 
dignity and worth of the human person.”208 Natural disasters wreak grave 
destruction on communities, killing and injuring many people and de-
stroying homes and infrastructure.209 This suffering is similar to that 
borne by victims of armed conflict and other gross violations of human 
rights who also experience death and displacement.210 Because the suf-
fering of natural disaster victims parallels that of victims deserving of 
 
 205. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), art. 11(1) (Dec. 16, 1966), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm. 
 206. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 207. Samuels, supra note 23, at 248. 
 208. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 198, ¶ 4(b). 
 209. See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.A. 
 210. See sources cited supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
2007] THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 703 
                                                                                                            
humanitarian intervention, it is reasonable to surmise that disaster-
affected States’ refusal of needed humanitarian assistance for natural dis-
aster victims also “shock[s] the conscience of mankind.” 211 Moreover, 
General Assembly Resolution 45/100 specifically pertains to humanitar-
ian assistance for natural disaster victims and regards neglect of these 
victims as constituting a “threat to human life and an offence to human 
dignity.”212 Therefore, affording human rights protections to natural dis-
aster victims satisfies the second requirement because such protection 
derives from the recognition of their inherent dignity and worth. 
The third requirement for establishing an international human rights in-
strument for natural disaster victims is that the instrument be precise 
enough to demonstrate “identifiable and practicable rights and obliga-
tions.”213 Applying the ICISS’ responsibility to protect theory to natural 
disasters reveals the rights and obligations of all States regarding disaster 
victims. The responsibility to protect identifies three obligations of disas-
ter-affected States and the international community of States with respect 
to victims of natural disasters.214 Thus, under the rationale of the ICISS’ 
theory of the responsibility to protect, the third requirement is met be-
cause the responsibility to protect demonstrates “identifiable and practi-
cable rights and obligations”215 of all States to protect natural disaster 
victims. 
The fourth requirement is that a human rights instrument for natural 
disaster victims provides “realistic and effective implementation machin-
ery, including reporting systems.”216 The current implementation meth-
ods for protecting the human rights of disaster victims exist through in-
ternational treaties, which establish agreements on ways to implement 
effective disaster relief operations.217 One notable international treaty is 
 
 211. Scheffer, supra note 31, at 270–71 (arguing that a new definition of humanitarian 
intervention should encompass responses to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, 
famine, volcanic eruptions, and man-made disasters because victims of these disasters 
suffer harms similar to those suffered by victims of oppressive governmental regimes 
who endure gross human rights abuses). 
 212. G.A. Res. 45/100, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/100 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
 213. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 198, ¶ 4(c). 
 214. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 215. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 198, ¶ 4(c). 
 216. Id. ¶ 4(d). 
 217. See generally INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE LAWS, supra note 78, at 24–39 
(noting that the IFRCRCS collected and analyzed various international disaster response 
treaties, which consisted of multilateral and bilateral treaties and U.N. resolutions. These 
treaties and resolutions addressed a broad range of disaster relief issues, relating to: (1) 
relationships between requesting and responding States; (2) responsibility and coordina-
tion of humanitarian assistance; (3) instructions for emergency relief teams; (4) access of 
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the Tampere Convention, which came into effect January 8, 2005 after 
unanimous adoption by seventy-five countries and ratification by thirty 
countries.218 The formation of the Tampere Convention resulted from the 
recognition of national regulations that hinder the import of telecommu-
nications equipment, thereby causing delay in the provision of relief and 
ultimately loss of life.219 Its provisions describe the procedures for effec-
tively deploying telecommunications resources to assist with disaster 
mitigation and relief operations.220 The Tampere Convention eases the 
restrictions imposed on telecommunications assistance by waiving cer-
tain regulatory barriers.221 The implementation of this international treaty 
recognizes the rights of natural disaster victims by ensuring an effective 
response from the telecommunications field.222 Another example is the 
aforementioned IOTWS program, which is a conglomeration of interna-
tional agencies and national governments working towards establishing a 
tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean.223 The Tampere Conven-
tion and the IOTWS are just some of the methods designed to provide 
effective protection of disaster victims, which thus demonstrates satisfac-
tion of the fourth requirement. 
The final requirement for establishing an international human rights in-
strument for natural disaster victims is that the instrument attracts “broad 
international support.”224 With the recent catastrophic natural disasters 
and the intense international criticism over disaster relief operations,225 
proposing an international human rights instrument for natural disaster 
victims would garner support from several countries. Furthermore, a re-
port by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlights the world’s vul-
nerability to natural disasters and recognizes the need for collective ef-
 
disaster relief personnel and equipment; (5) relief goods and customs procedures; (6) 
status, immunities, and protection of personnel; and (7) costs resulting from disaster relief 
operations.). 
 218. Press Release, U.N. Office at Geneva, Tampere Convention: Saving Lives 
Through Emergency Telecommunications, U.N. Doc. M/05/01 (Jan. 7, 2005). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. (explaining that the Tampere Convention: (1) waives various regulatory barri-
ers that inhibit the import, coordination, and use of telecommunications equipment; (2) 
exempts relief agencies from taxation and duties; and (3) grants privileges and immuni-
ties to the NGO staff). 
 222. Id. (quoting Jan Egeland, U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator and Operational 
Coordinator of the Tampere Convention, “OCHA aims to ensure the best response to 
disasters to prevent loss of life and help survivors”). 
 223. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.i. 
 224. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 198, ¶ 4(e). 
 225. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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forts to address their devastating effects.226 Therefore, this last require-
ment is met because it seems promising that launching a proposal for an 
international human rights instrument for natural disaster victims would 
receive extensive international support. 
Implementing an international human rights instrument for natural dis-
aster victims requires some sort of legal framework detailing its implica-
tions,227 which would be clarified once all States enter into an interna-
tional agreement founded upon this principle.228 The recent catastrophic 
natural disasters demonstrate the need for an international treaty clarify-
ing the responsibilities of all States regarding natural disasters.229
An international disaster relief treaty is not a novel idea, but one that 
the Convention Establishing an International Relief Union (the Conven-
tion) pioneered in the 1930s.230 The Convention attempted to establish a 
legal framework for humanitarian assistance to natural disaster victims: 
the International Relief Union (IRU). 231 The Convention founded the 
IRU on two principles: respect for territorial sovereignty and non-
discrimination in disaster assistance.232 Members of the Convention ap-
pointed an Executive Committee to control and organize relief operations 
through the services of the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
the League of Red Cross Societies.233 Article 2 of the IRU outlined the 
Convention’s mission: 
 to furnish first aid, in the form of funds, resources, and assis-
tance, to victims of natural disasters; 
 to coordinate the efforts of disaster relief organizations; 
 
 226. In Larger Freedom, supra note 77, at 21, ¶¶ 65–66. 
 227. Coursen-Neff, supra note 86, at 702 (recognizing that even if the rights of disaster 
victims were recognized as human rights norms, the implications of such rights on the 
role of disaster-affected States and the international community of States would remain 
unclear without a legal framework detailing their implications). 
 228. Id.; see GREEN, supra note 20, at 68. 
 229. In Larger Freedom, supra note 77, at 49–50, ¶¶ 202–08 (recognizing that events, 
in particular the Indian Ocean tsunami, have escalated the demands of the international 
humanitarian response system and demonstrated the need for more predictability in re-
sponse capacity, funding, and right of access and security for humanitarian relief work-
ers). 
 230. Forsythe, supra note 22, at 286. 
 231. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 18. The League of Nations took up the IRU 
project in 1922. Forty-three member States attended the Conference for the Creation of 
an International Relief Union in Geneva and adopted the Convention and Statute of the 
IRU. Thirty States adhered to the Convention, which became effective on December 27, 
1932. Id. at 19. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 19–20. 
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 to encourage the study of preventative measures against disas-
ters; and 
 to induce all people to render mutual international assistance.234 
The IRU’s objectives seemed sensible. Although as a practical matter, 
it failed to provide the means for supplying relief to disaster victims, 
which brought about its demise.235 Later attempts to revive the IRU in 
the 1940s also failed.236 Nevertheless, the IRU initiative raised aware-
ness concerning the need for an international legal framework that clari-
fies the responsibility of all States to provide humanitarian assistance to 
natural disaster victims.237
V. CONCLUSION 
The proposed solution to the issue of providing adequate relief for 
catastrophic natural disasters attempts to clarify the responsibilities of all 
States to protect disaster victims.238 The suggested scheme entails: (1) 
applying the responsibility to protect to natural disasters; (2) recognizing 
and codifying the rights of disaster victims within the regime of interna-
tional human rights law; and (3) establishing an international treaty that 
imposes on all States the responsibility to protect natural disaster victims. 
During the past decade, the world has endured the wrath of natural dis-
asters, which have caused substantial destruction to numerous countries 
and severe devastation to mass amounts of people.239 Now is the time to 
revive the vision originally embarked upon by the IRU.240 Due to the 
 
 234. CAMILLE GORGÉ, THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF UNION: ITS ORIGINS, AIMS, MEANS 
AND FUTURE 24–25 (1938). 
 235. MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 2, at 20–21 (noting that the IRU’s failure was due 
to inadequate funding and its premature expression of universal solidarity aimed at bene-
fiting disaster victims). 
 236. Id. at 95. 
 237. Id. at 20–21 (noting that the creation of the IRU, an organization focused primar-
ily on providing humanitarian assistance for natural disaster victims, raised awareness of 
the issue of international disaster relief among the international community). 
 238. Green proposes a noteworthy approach to establish international responsibility (a 
shared responsibility among States) regarding natural disasters. First, the proposal calls 
for delegating “the authority and responsibility” of representing the needs of disaster 
victims “to one [independent] agency,” which must be agreed upon by the international 
community (State governments and international and private organizations). Second, the 
proposal emphasizes the need for the international community to establish a formal 
mechanism that recognizes international responsibility for humanitarian assistance during 
natural disasters. GREEN, supra note 20, at 65–76. 
 239. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 240. See GREEN, supra note 20, at 15–17 (noting that while the occurrence of natural 
disasters has not increased in frequency, but remained relatively stable, the worldwide 
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emerging principle of the responsibility to protect and the universal rec-
ognition of international human rights, an international agreement recog-
nizing how these ideals apply to natural disasters would improve hu-
manitarian assistance. Such an agreement would hopefully obligate all 
States to defer to their responsibility to protect disaster victims rather 
than their political agendas, thus de-politicizing international disaster 
relief. Establishing an international treaty that clarifies the responsibili-
ties of all States to protect natural disaster victims would require a great 
deal of international diplomacy.241 Achieving such international coopera-
tion would be difficult to accomplish in the near future.242 However, in-
creased awareness among all States concerning their responsibility to 
protect natural disaster victims would improve the imperfect system of 




human cost of natural disasters has gradually escalated, as disasters have become more 
complex, causing destruction to diverse regions and populations). Green further notes the 
need to consider natural disasters not as an “isolated” problem, but as a “multidimen-
sional” occurrence that compels different approaches and responses in handling their 
consequences. Id. at 77. In 1989, the General Assembly declared the 1990s to be the In-
ternational Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, which was an attempt to “reduce 
through concerted international action, especially in developing countries, the loss of life, 
property damage, and social and economic disruption caused by natural disasters” and 
improve disaster prevention, mitigation, and response. G.A. Res. 236, U.N. GAOR, 44th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/236/Annex (1989); Coursen-Neff, supra note 86, at 656, 
n.42; Levitt, supra note 61, at 176 (expressing the imperativeness with which the interna-
tional community should recognize the responsibility to protect by inquiring, “[h]ow 
many more millions of people must die before the international community [recognizes 
the responsibility to protect as] a global imperative?”). 
 241. McClatchey, supra note 64, at 679–80 (noting that scholars have recently begun 
focusing on the value of international diplomacy, rather than the merits of international 
law, to reinforce all States to recognize their responsibilities to humanity). 
 242. Id. at 678–79 (recognizing the view that despite the binding force of international 
law, States will continue to act in their own best interests and not that of their people, 
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